Bad habit or considered decision?: The need for a closer examination of prospective parents’ views

What I most appreciate about H. Theixos and S. B. Jamil’s article, “The Bad Habit of Bearing Children,” is their basic scrutiny of unreflective procreation. Bearing biological children is not a bad habit in the way that smoking is a bad habit. There is nothing intrinsically harmful to a parent’s health in bearing a biological child.

Nor is bearing biological children a bad habit in the way that biting one’s nails is a bad habit. There is nothing socially unacceptable in bearing biological children; on the contrary, for married couples at least, it is largely a social expectation. Bearing biological children is a bad habit precisely because it is often done out of habit, rather than as the result of conscious and careful choice. Given the convincing case the authors make regarding the long-lasting suffering of orphans, I agree that a prospective parent’s decision to create a new life when there are already existing orphans ought to be subject to moral scrutiny, and that this scrutiny reveals a defeasible moral obligation to prioritize adoption. I am skeptical, however, that Theixos and Jamil have adequately identified the defeaters to this moral obligation.

The crux of the authors’ argument rests in their interpretation of Peter Singer’s statement from “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972): “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. … [This principle] requires us only to prevent what is bad, and not to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important” (241). What counts as “comparable moral importance”? We know a lot about the suffering caused by famine. We also know a lot about the suffering caused by lacking a primary caregiver in childhood. But what information, if any, do we need to know about those who are asked to do the rescuing? In the case of prospective parents who would give up biological parenthood in order to adopt, what do we need to know about these adults in order to be able to judge what counts as a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the suffering prevented through adoption?

Theixos and Jamil do not probe these questions, and, therefore, must import their own subjective values into the calculation of a “moral sacrifice on a par to the suffering prevented.” Without a deeper analysis, it would seem to be impossible to avoid doing so. In the case of famine, it is easy to see that parting with money, especially in a context of affluence, is not on a moral par with starvation. In the case of adopting rather than having a biological child, it is less easy to see clearly the sacrifices being made by prospective parents and judge whether they are on a par with the orphan’s suffering. All things considered, Theixos and Jamil seem to dismiss the desire for biological children—which they attribute broadly to “bionormativity”—too quickly and completely, without sufficient investigation into the roots of “bionormativity” and whether, and under what circumstances, it is justifiable.

Interestingly, there are two sacrifices described by the authors that rise to the level of “comparable moral importance.” In other words, there are two sacrifices that could defeat the moral obligation to prioritize adoption: (1) financial and legal barriers, and (2) “not wanting to become a parent.” At first glance, financial and legal barriers to adoption seem unimpressive when compared to the lifelong suffering of the permanent orphan. After all, financial and legal barriers are merely practical barriers that can be overcome. How are they truly on a “moral par” with the social, emotional, and developmental harm experienced by orphans? There are loans that could be obtained, lawyers who could be hired. Nonetheless, even though the authors are comparing very different kinds of sacrifices (money vs. psychological well-being), they make a convincing case that the financial/legal costs can be...