A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign by Timothy D. Johnson (review)

at Coleto Creek. Fannin claimed that Urrea promised to spare the lives of the captives, but the key surviving document—signed by Fannin, discovered in Mexico by Eugene C. Barker, and published in 1928 by Carlos E. Castañeda— shows that the Texans surrendered to the discretion and the disposition of the Mexican government (under whose laws they could be legally executed as pirates). Bradle fails to grapple with the fact of Fannin’s signature; he does not even list Castañeda among his sources. But Stout confuses the issue even more (p. 158) by citing Castañeda while ignoring a key footnote provided by that author (The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution, p. 62, n26), and by misconstruing (p. 197) the original Spanish in Castañeda’s discussion (p. 57, n25) of Urrea’s alleged reference to the Texan soldiers as having capitulated (in the sense of agreeing to specific terms of surrender). It is hard to argue with the conclusion apparently shared by Stout and Bradle: that the important events surrounding Goliad have failed to capture the attention they deserve largely because the “Texan hero” at the center of these events, while gallant and brave, was utterly incompetent. Stout (p. 82) calls Fannin “lazy, ignorant, and afraid of his men,” and Bradle implicitly agrees. Yet within this ugly tragedy lies a compelling story that has yet to be adequately told. North Carolina State University James E. Crisp A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign. By Timothy D. Johnson. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Pp. 384. Illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-0-70061-541-4. $39.95, cloth.) The Mexican War of 1846–1848, even though it was the United States’ first major foreign war, and even though it filled out the United States’ continental borders (including settling the disputed southern border of Texas), runs the danger of becoming a “forgotten war,” much like the War of 1812 or Korea. College survey history courses rush through it to get to the Civil War; scholars and readers alike still gravitate to more “popular” wars, like the Civil War and World War II. As such, any strong work on the Mexican War is a welcome addition to the scholarship on the topic. A book as excellently realized as Timothy D. Johnson’s A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign is doubly welcome. Johnson is a history professor at Lipscomb University in Nashville. His earlier work includes a biography of Gen. Winfield Scott, who was the chief architect of victory in the Mexican War. That work prompted Johnson to write this book, which focuses on Scott’s campaign from the beaches of Vera Cruz to Mexico City. The Mexico City campaign did not grab all the land the United States wanted from Mexico; Stephen Watts Kearny did that in 1846. Nor did it provide the initial U.S. victories in the war; Zachary Taylor’s army did that. Nevertheless, it provided the leverage to end the war and achieve American goals. Johnson’s thesis is multi-tiered. First, Scott remarkably maintained order and discipline within his army during its 250-mile push to Mexico City. Scott realized 320 Southwestern Historical Quarterly January *jan 09 11/26/08 12:00 PM Page 320 that a ravaging army ran the risk of alienating Mexican citizens and driving them into a costly, long-term guerrilla war. Second, Scott also showed, through his willingness to momentarily halt his offensive after key battles, that he wanted not to conquer Mexico, but instead to convince her leaders to accede to American demands. “This study argues” writes Johnson, “that [Scott] devised a sophisticated pacification plan . . . and a strategy of moderation” (p. 5). Scott’s leadership also marked a huge step in the professionalization of the United States Army. With many West Point graduates (and future Civil War generals ) in his ranks, Scott relied on their knowledge and expertise to negotiate the rough terrain and battlements that marked his route. In so doing, Johnson also credits Scott with being uniquely able to overcome what Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called the “friction” of war (p. 3). Johnson relies on more than 150...