Abstract

The alleged but unclear distinction between so-called “immanent” and so-called “transeunt” causation is structurally similar to an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of potentiality (dunamis). It is argued that Aristotle’s distinction is in turn grounded in one between a metaphysically basic notion, rooted in his property theory, and a metaphysically posterior notion proper to the understanding of change in the science of nature. By examining Aristotle’s distinction, we can give a satisfying account of immanent and transeunt causation more generally. Furthermore, once we clarify the distinction in this way, some contemporary appeals to immanent causation turn out to be misguided, while others look promising.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 33-60
Launched on MUSE
2014-01-28
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.