Abstract

We discuss Kochan’s recent criticism of the work of Joseph Rouse (Kochan 2011). We argue that Kochan fails to show that both Rouse’s own work and his Heidegger interpretation are plagued by insurmountable problems. We also try to locate the deeper, meta-philosophical reasons that are responsible for what we take to be Kochan’s misreading of Rouse’s work. This allows us to throw some light on the standoff that so often seems to characterize debates on scientific realism.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1530-9274
Print ISSN
1063-6145
Pages
pp. 453-462
Launched on MUSE
2013-11-28
Open Access
No
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