Abstract

Kant holds that (1) his theory of transcendental idealism does not imply that our experiences are systematically illusory, that (2) appearances are not numerically distinct from things as they are in themselves, and that (3) his idealism is, in some important sense, idealist. In this paper, I produce a reading of transcendental idealism that accounts for each of these claims. I recommend that we model the mind-world relationship according to transcendental idealism on an understanding of how certain of our judgments refer to the contents of our illusions and dreams. I also present the implications that my analysis has for the “problem of affection” and for Kant’s views on freedom.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 589-615
Launched on MUSE
2013-10-08
Open Access
No
Archive Status
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