With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North by Carol Reardon (review)

The name of Swiss writer Antoine-Henri Jomini is popular in discussions of Civil War military theory. Well known in Europe for his writings on military strategy, particularly his Summary of the Art of War, Jomini is connected to the 1861-65 conflict. Carol Reardon's newest work questions the extent of Jomini's effect on American military theory by casting a wider net over numerous European military influences and examining the use of military theory in the United States. She argues that, ultimately, the United States did not utilize a unified military theory during the Civil War or develop one after four years of conflict.

In response to the crisis of the Civil War, Reardon asserts that there was little specific use of Jomini by military officers. Not only were there several prominent European military works in employ, American officers seemed uninspired by any specific military theory. Conflict and confusion among the Union's top officials led to inaction and frustration in the early years of the war. Jomini's emphasis on strategy and planning sat uneasily with those who wanted swift and forceful action against the Confederate armies. Adding to the debate were disagreements among the military and civilian populations about what developed a good officer. For some, a military education and an understanding of military theory equipped an officer for their duty; for others, natural genius arose in times of war. Men of both types found success and failure during the Civil War, and as Union armies went through one commanding officer after another, Americans fiercely debated each one. Reardon found that there was a rise in the publication of military theory books, including Jomini's; however, these were consumed by a public audience of "armchair generals." If Jomini and other European theorists did have an influence in Civil War America, it was among the civilian population, not military officials.

The idea of developing a set military theory and training a corps of officers within that theory made progress after the war, with beginning efforts to create military education programs for officers. That progress would only come after four years of a war that destroyed many of the principles acquired from European military theories. Advancements in weaponry, different environments, and the grueling pace of the final year of war meant that Jomini's style of warfare was somewhat outdated. In addition, most military theorists ignored the human aspect of war, the men who needed certain basic needs met before they could be efficient soldiers. In the context of the Civil War, those needs were frequently denied, leading soldiers to break down or become inefficient on the battlefield. Reardon particularly analyzes the effects of Ulysses S. Grant's 1864 Overland campaign on the Army of the Potomac. While soldiers were cheered by the forward motion of Grant's approach, the conditions and unrelenting activity destroyed them in a fashion untouchable by military theory. In that situation, any adherence to military strategy could not match the pace of the campaign; there was little time for basic necessities, there was none to create maneuvers and strategies. Even after the war, there was little improvement; Reardon argues that despite four years of hard experience America remained without its own developed military theory.

Reardon's analysis successfully contradicts the impression of Jomini's dominance during the Civil War and conveys the debates about and inconsistency of military theory in nineteenth-century America. The only question left unanswered was whether works on military theory influenced those armchair generals who eventually enlisted in the army; did the works they read as civilians affect their thoughts as soldiers, or is there no connection? Not only does Reardon globalize the topic by examining the basis of European influences on military theory, she expands...