Mystery of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? by Michael Ruse (review)

324 letters in canada 1999 distinguished (a task the editors acknowledge as a `sometimes problematic issue'), perhaps this aspect of model-independence of a theory should be remembered in order to counterbalance the emphasis in the case studies on the power of models and the impotence of theories. In R.I.G. Hughes's study of the Ising model and computer simulations in physics, an immensely successful twentieth-century version of this drive towards model independence for theories is nicely illustrated: the renormalization group analysis of critical phenomena is an attempt to minimize the influence of details of model construction on theory formulation. That theories apply only `exactly as far as [their] interpretative models can stretch' may sound somewhat `pessimistic,' as Nancy Cartwright emphasizes in her study of theories of superconductivity; but in the case of theories that are largely model-independent, such limitations of the theory's reach shouldn't be of too much concern. (ALEXANDER RUEGER) Michael Ruse. Mystery of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? Harvard University Press. xii, 298. $42.50 This extremely readable and interesting book is about the nature of science. Do scientists give us a disinterested and objective account of the world? Or do they somehow concoct theories which perhaps serve their interests and reflect their subjective values? Michael Ruse says a bit of each, but he mainly sides with the angels of objectivity. And he is surely right to do so. The real trick is showing how subjective values interact with the objective pursuit of knowledge. This Ruse does astutely through the device of individual case studies. Key figures in the history of evolutionary biology are given individual chapters in which their personal biographies and scientific views are discussed in an integrated way. Naturally, Darwin and Huxley are here, but so are a large number of moderns including Dawkins, Gould, Lewontin, and Wilson. As well as the ten individual biologists covered (the others are Erasmus Darwin, Julian Huxley, Dobzhansky , Parker, and Sepkoski), there is a beginning chapter on the philosophy of science (Kuhn vs Popper) and a final chapter on metaphors and metavalues . Stephen Jay Gould, to pick one of Ruse's examples, is well known as a popularizer of the biological sciences; indeed, he is one of the great essayists of our times. Gould is also well known for his theory of punctuated equilibria. This is (depending on whom you hear it from) a genuine rival to Darwinian evolution or a mere supplement to it. Gould claims that there are significant rapid changes in the history of species often brought about by major environmental change (think of comets and dinosaurs) or by having part of a population cut off from the rest (known as the founder principle). Instead of Darwinian gradualism, Gould sees short periods of humanities 325 rapid change followed by long periods of stasis. What has this to do with values? According to Ruse, plenty. For one thing, Gould is interested in upgrading his own cherished discipline of paleontology. Instead of taking their marching orders from geneticists, the fossil folks can lead the way. Second, Gould has a Marxist background, and punctuated equilibria fit in nicely with a picture of history highlighted by revolutions. Third, the Darwinian gradualism which he opposes is tied to the so-called adaptationist program of sociobiology, a theory which tries to account for all human characteristics and behaviours in biologically adaptive terms. Gould, perhaps because of his Jewishness and his socialism , sees human differences as more the result of culture and environment than of nature. These, according to Ruse, are the kinds of values that can play a role in the thinking of a scientist. But do they determine scientific outcomes? Did they determine the outcome for Gould? There is a classic distinction philosophers make between `discovery' (having an idea in the first place) and `justification' (having objective evidence for accepting it). In a pinch we could say that Gould's values contributed to the former, but played no role in the latter. Ruse notes that the scientific community has paid scant attention to punctuated equilibria. So he concludes that Gould's values did not contribute to the course of evolutionary thinking. By contrast...