To the Editors

In a recent issue of Kritika, Andreas Oberender published a review essay on two books, including mine on the so-called 1952 "Stalin Note" on Germany.¹ At that time, the Soviet Union had officially proposed signing a peace treaty with the other victorious powers by which Germany would be reunified as a neutral state. While I myself am certain, based on what all declassified sources from Soviet archives show, that Stalin had no desire to sacrifice the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and give up the USSR's position in Germany, the historical debate (especially in Germany) is now focusing on the decision-making process in the Kremlin under Stalin in his last years. Oberender concludes that "Stalin's role remains as obscure as before" (948).

In fact, Stalin's role is quite clear, as my book was designed to show. Until the very end of his life, he decided all crucial questions regarding foreign policy on his own.² No single Politburo decision on any matter would or could have passed without his approval. Even when he was not in Moscow, all relevant materials were sent to him. There is absolutely no indication that even a single decision could have been made without him. If one studies individual documents out of context—for example, Andrei Vyshinskii´s report to Stalin on 2 February—one could come to Oberender's conclusion that Vyshinskii "took the lead" (944). But in fact, Vyshinskii never did. On the contrary, he was a loyal lackey of Stalin and always restricted by instructions from above. It was simply his job to keep Stalin and the Soviet leadership informed. Oberender is in some sense right to "remind" me that one cannot distinguish "the different, partially conflicting aims [of] all these actors" (948). In an environment where people like Vyshinskii had to fear for their lives if they tried to act against Stalin's will, and in this case eventually caused the loss of the GDR, one cannot speak about conflicting aims. The fact nonetheless remains that even if some had ideas different from those of Stalin, no one would have dared to pursue them while Stalin was alive, especially not on questions of such importance as Germany.

There is no evidence that Stalin would have given up Soviet positions in East Germany. No neutrality for a unified Germany was ever discussed in Moscow in the last years of Stalin's life. Why should such evidence be kept secret in Moscow archives?

Finally, Oberender criticizes not only my "handling of sources" (947) but also my engagement with secondary literature. He mentions especially Wilfried Loth and Geoffrey Roberts. Loth is an expert on the West in the Cold War and does not speak Russian. Regarding Roberts, it seems to me sufficient to note that Vladislav Zubok criticized him for assuming that Stalin meant whatever he said or wrote. "We know how many people perished because they trusted Stalin's words, and took them at a [sic] face value. Taking Stalin's words as facts is a methodological approach for Roberts. For me it is a bizarre misunderstanding of Stalin's personality, and the nature of his immense power."³ There is nothing else to add.

If Oberender is right to assert that no consensus will ever be reached on this issue, then this is because some historians choose to ignore new facts in favor of fantastic arguments to the effect that a neutral Germany was more useful to Stalin than a divided one. All evidence from Soviet archives shows the opposite.⁴ No single internal document showing that Stalin would have preferred a unified, neutral Germany has ever been found; nor will this ever occur.