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  • Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond by Manus I. Midlarsky
  • Michael M. Gunter
Origins of Political Extremism: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, Manus I. Midlarsky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 442 pp., hardcover, $103.00/£63.00, paperback, $36.99/£22.99, e-book available.

Manus I. Midlarsky builds on his earlier study The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (2005) by presenting a framework involving ephemeral gains—"control and then loss of political authority within a given territory" (p. 26)—which, when lost, lead those dispossessed to political extremism, violence, and even genocide. As the author explains, "This book advances the basic idea that the origins of political extremism are to be found in the contraction of authority space" (p. 10). He elaborates how "an ephemeral gain occurs when a severe loss (territory, population) or threats of its imminent occurrence, typically perceived as a catastrophe, is preceded by a period of societal gain, which in turn is preceded by a period of subordination" (p. 25). The author also argues that "exposure to national territorial loss within the ephemeral gain will make inhabitants of that country or region more likely to commit extremist acts than those of another country or region that did not experience such loss" (p. 19).

The author's framework is illustrated by a generic figure (p. 28) involving first a triumphal period, followed by a decline into subordination, an ephemeral gain, and finally a loss. This framework subsequently is replicated numerous times throughout [End Page 164] the book to illustrate specific examples of political extremism involving Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian fascism and German Nazism; radical Islamism including the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, Al-Mahajiroun (British-born radicals), Sudan, Chechnya, and Muslims in India; Soviet, and to a much lesser extent Chinese and Cambodian communism; the "rampaging military" (p. 243) in Japan, Pakistan, and Indonesia; extreme nationalism in Sri Lanka, Poland, Serbia, and Croatia; and finally Ottoman, German, and Rwandan genocide. A second generic figure representing "mortality salience" (p. 67) further develops the author's framework.

Midlarsky has compiled an impressive amount of detailed historical data to illustrate his framework. In the case of Germany, for example, his figure (p. 284) traces how German authority space declined due to the proliferation of German principalities, experienced ephemeral gain with unification after 1871, suffered loss with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, rose again with the early victories of World War II, but then suffered renewed loss with the defeat of 1945. "Thus, territorial loss clearly is a predictor of excess war criminality, confirming the critical importance of territorial loss or the threat of its imminent occurrence in the explanation of genocide" (p. 287).

Midlarsky's work will help students of political extremism and mass violence better describe, explain, and even modestly predict these murderous phenomena. For example, given how they so neatly fit into his "pattern of subordination, gain, and loss," Midlarsky notes that "Germans born in Alsace-Lorraine and Malmedy account for by far the highest proportion of war criminals" (p. 284): their more acute sense of loss after World War I may have reflected the earlier euphoria they experienced following unification with Germany in 1871. As Midlarsky puts it, "the periods of German subordination (1648-1871), gain (1871-1919), and loss (1919-1940) conform to the expectations" (p. 289) of the framework.

In pursuing his framework, however, the author seems to me at times to approach an empathetic understanding of Nazi behavior. For example, he argues that Heinrich Himmler's views stemmed partially from the murder at the end of World War I of "seven members of the Thule society, a conservative aristocratic society that gave rise to the German Workers' Party, later to become the NSDAP under Hitler's leadership" (p. 295).

When dealing with contemporary radical Islamist movements, Midlarsky problematically includes Saddam Hussein's defeat (p. 173) as an example of a loss that led to violence. Maybe, but Saddam Hussein of course was essentially a secular atheist who began to use Islam opportunistically only late in his murderous career, when other options weakened. At the same time, the author does...

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