In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Menschenwürde nach Nietzsche: Die Geschichte eines Begriffes by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
  • Greg Whitlock
Menschenwürde nach Nietzsche: Die Geschichte eines Begriffes, by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010. 288 pp. ISBN: HB: 978-3-534-20931-6. Hardcover, $65.00.

In his Menschenwürde nach Nietzsche: Die Geschichte eines Begriffes (Human Dignity According to/after Nietzsche: The History of a Concept), Stefan Lorenz Sorgner conceives a bold plan and executes it remarkably well, with noteworthy results. His plan entails describing four paradigmatic notions of human dignity, then presenting Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of the notion of human dignity in relation to the four paradigms, and finally, reflecting on Nietzsche’s criticism in a way that embraces much of it and, consequently, largely rejects the humanist notion of the dignity of man. Sorgner takes the additional steps of arguing for a posthumanism to replace the outmoded humanist notion of human dignity. Each phase of the plan is carried out with care in every detail.

Although Sorgner takes every occasion to locate the reader within its structure with elaborate signposting, the overall organization of his book may prove to be difficult even for the careful reader to grasp. Sorgner devotes his first chapter to the necessary and sufficient conditions for the notions of human dignity that interest him and Nietzsche. Thus he indicates the scope of the criticism of human dignity to follow. Then he devotes a long section of the work to paradigmatic notions of human dignity to give the reader a sense of the variety of different notions of specifically human dignity. They all satisfy the necessary conditions for the sort of concept that Sorgner wishes to defend, namely, the notion of necessary dignity. For many readers, it may become easy to get lost in the long presentation, though again Sorgner pays great attention to highlighting his organization. A long rendition of Nietzsche’s theories of will to power, genealogy, and perspectivism follows, which, since it is not immediately directed toward the notion of dignity, may be overwhelming. But Sorgner’s interpretation of GS 115, which follows the presentation, is well worth the wait. The reader finds Nietzsche attacking the four theories so elaborately portrayed. Sorgner works through an impressive interpretation of the short aphorism, though at many spots the usual conflicts of interpretation break out. In my own case, I considered Sorgner’s interpretations to be, if anything, too literally rather than too loosely connected to the text. And in particular, my own interpretation of Nietzsche on science, notably the figures Darwin and Lamarck, differs from Sorgner’s. In crucial places concerning Darwin and Nietzsche, Sorgner gives inadequate evidence, in my opinion. Nor does Sorgner show evidence of hidden sources of Nietzsche’s scientific thought experiments. Other readers, of course, may object to other details in his interpretation. But what he does succeed in providing is a highly plausible, careful rendition of Nietzsche’s thoughts on human dignity. Sorgner proves that he has, after Nietzsche’s metaphor, “long legs.” This section of the book definitely rewards the two long marches required to reach it. Sorgner’s interpretation of Nietzsche is quite complex and nuanced, and Nietzsche’s argument in GS 115 and connected notes and published passages succeed in their iconoclastic campaign.

The reader must understand, further, that the book under consideration contains a certain irony or sarcasm. That Sorgner disagrees with Nietzsche about contingent human dignity is something of a façade, since contingent dignity really interests Sorgner little in comparison to the comparatively decisive attack that has been launched on the sacred citadel of human dignity at the heart of the Platonic Christian Kantian tradition. On one reading of Sorgner, “normative equality” may have become something of a cynical Hobbesian gesture.

In the final wing of his labyrinthine architectonic, Sorgner attempts to advance beyond Nietzsche’s position into a postdignity, postequality posthumanism. This is truly where Sorgner comes into his own. I found a great deal of what Sorgner writes to be interesting and much in the spirit of Nietzsche; he lays out a scientifically informed critical hermeneutic concerned with humanity as a changing species and that advances a notion of humanity that...

pdf