Imitation and Education: A Philosophical Inquiry into Learning by Example by Bryan R. Warnick (review)

Introduction

When I reflect on reading Bryan Warnick's Imitation and Education, I am appreciative that I was given the opportunity not only to read it but also to think about its issues as thoroughly as I have in the process of writing this essay. I share Warnick's surprise that, prior to his book, no one had attempted to explore the relationship between imitation and education in a philosophically meaningful manner. Before reading his book, I did not realize that imitation was such a philosophically rich topic, especially once you consider its educational implications. In particular, I was oblivious to the connection between various conceptions of the self and imitation. I had no idea that different interpretations of the self (e.g., an Enlightenment view of the self and a narrative view of the self) could yield such radically dissimilar theories of imitation. And this is where Warnick and I begin to diverge. Warnick believes that the narrative view of the self is ultimately incompatible with the standard view of imitation, but I disagree. I contend that one can hold the view that the self is in large part formed by one's community, and can still believe that the self has control over who and what it wants to imitate. Although this may require a more conservative interpretation of the narrative self, I believe the two apparently disparate views can be reconciled. In order to do this, however, an additional component must be introduced: the faculty of judgment. In the end this is where I find Warnick's analysis to be most wanting. Although his investigation of imitation is quite meticulous, it is not comprehensive enough, in that it fails to provide a meaningful discussion of judgment, which must remain central to any theory of imitation. One philosopher who does not underestimate the role of judgment in imitation is Kant. Kant, more than anyone, understands that judgment is necessary to inform a self when imitation is appropriate and when one needs to move beyond imitation.

The following essay is composed of four major parts (although each part may have one or more subsections). In part 1 I attempt a sympathetic reconstruction of Warnick's argument. In part 2 I offer criticisms of the main argument, the foundations of which are already present in his book. I argue that despite his efforts to quell these criticisms, for the most part they remain unanswered. In part 3 I provide a brief sketch of Kant's theory of judgment through his conception of genius, which is where we ultimately find his thoughts on imitation. In part 4, the conclusion, I directly connect Kant's theory of judgment with Warnick's enterprise in Imitation and Education.

Part 1

Standard model of imitation

According to Warnick, the standard model of imitation contains three essential elements: "the description of an example's action, the description of the results of the action, and an exhortation to do what the example did."¹ Throughout his book, but specifically in chapter 2, Warnick uses several examples that demonstrate how the standard model works. His earliest but perhaps most effective example is that of Homer. In ancient Greece, Homer was the educator par excellence, not Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, even though the latter happened to be the tutor of Alexander the Great. In fact, a strong case can be made that Plato wrote the Republic as a response to Homer's stranglehold on Athenian education.² So what exactly did Homer teach that made him so influential? Homer taught that education consists of nothing more than the imitation of heroic examples. For instance, Warnick uses the scene from the Odyssey where Athena implores Telemachus to follow the example of Orestes, who killed his father's murderer and was celebrated in glory as a result.³ If we pay close attention to this scene involving Athena and Telemachus, we...