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Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 443-445



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Martin Schönfeld. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xv + 348. Cloth, $55.00.

Kant's precritical philosophy has often been judged as lacking continuity, originality, and, indeed, philosophical relevance. Martin Schönfeld's impressive new study disputes this assessment, claiming instead that "the philosophy of the young Kant reveals a greater unity and a more interesting coherence than previously assumed" (245). The author further argues that Kant's precritical thought is philosophically interesting in its own right. Schönfeld is to be commended for his successful refutation of the standard caricature and for deftly defending his reading of this formative period in Kant's thought. Recent years have seen a number of similar attempts to rehabilitate Kant's precritical thought, but Schönfeld's study will no doubt become the standard against which future scholarship is measured. [End Page 443]

Schönfeld locates the unity of Kant's precritical philosophy in his purported "grand synthesis of the Newtonian model of nature with three assumptions of metaphysics: the purposive development of nature, the possibility of a morally relevant freedom, and the existence of God" (209). Schönfeld divides Kant's precritical philosophy into three periods comprising (1) Kant's initial failure during the 1740s to formulate a non-Newtonian philosophy of nature, (2) his conversion to Newtonianism in the 1750s (and the constructive philosophizing of this period), and (3) the period of intense self-criticism in the 1760s leading to the collapse of the precritical project. The originality of Schönfeld's typology is evident since many scholars claim that Kant was a Newtonian ab initio. In addition, Schönfeld claims that the precritical project ends with the "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" (1766), a departure from the orthodox extension of the project to the "Inaugural Dissertation" (1770).

Such readings are driven by the author's generally trenchant analyses of Kant's attempt to construct a unified philosophy of nature. In this regard, Schönfeld's analysis of Kant's attempt to reconcile physical processes and purposiveness in the "Universal Natural History" (1755) is particularly insightful; and Kant's attempts to account for the compatibility of determinism and human freedom in the "New Elucidation" (1755) and to formulate a theory of active matter in the "Physical Monadology" (1766) receive readings of a similarly high caliber. In addition, Schönfeld's extensive bibliography and his many references to thinkers now long-forgotten—yet indispensable for understanding Kant's early thought (e.g., Georg Bilfinger, a Wolffian thinker and source for Kant's lifelong strategy of seeking a via media between opposing positions)—are invaluable research tools.

Also deserving mention is Schönfeld's examination of the "Dreams" essay. Once thought to be a mere critique of Swedenborg's mysticism, this work actually marks the beginning of Kant's doubts regarding the very possibility of speculative metaphysics. The precritical philosophy is largely concerned with the nature of real interaction between substances—contra occasionalist and pre-established harmony theories—and with Kant's interpretation of physical influx that grounds the same. Yet Kant realizes in the "Dreams" that his own account of a commercium of substances (as well as his claims regarding the soul) seems to lead quite naturally to the notion of a divine influx governing the interaction of disembodied spirits (regarding which Swedenborg purported to have first-hand experience). This realization, Schönfeld argues, motivates the collapse of the precritical project and Kant's recognition that an examination of mental capabilities must precede any speculation regarding nonsensible objects. It is to Schönfeld's credit that he takes this text, which is usually either ignored or ridiculed, seriously and presents a comprehensive and cogent reading of the same.

Though generally successful in defending his reading of the precritical Kant, some of Schönfeld's positions are rather suspect. Indeed, Schönfeld claims that "in the 1740s, Kant either rejected Newtonian ideas out of hand, or he...

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