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  • The Dogs of War: 1861 by Emory M. Thomas
  • Mark F. Miller
The Dogs of War: 1861. Emory M. Thomas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-1951-7470-0, 128 pp., cloth, $14.95.

Emory Thomas, one of the deans of Civil War historians, has offered a provocative slender volume on the coming of war through the summer of 1861. Thomas describes his work as "a think book" of revisionist history in which he proposes to "ask new questions of essentially well-known facts" (ix). Thomas asks and concludes, feigning a sense of disbelief, "What were they thinking?" He suggests that "the Civil War happened because nearly no one had a clue about what they were doing" (ix).

In his opening chapter, Thomas analyzes the "Martial Moment" and samples prewar attitudes of the leading contenders north and south. Amazed by the "downright stupidity" of most of the principal combatants, Thomas finds several different points of view as the country faced off through the winter and spring of 1861 (8). Many [End Page 377] felt that should there be war, it would be a single engagement or a brief campaign. However, Thomas also finds many in the South who longed for "an apocalyptic answer" to cleanse the landscape once and for all; likewise, an element in the North argued the therapeutic efforts of a war that would be "good for us"(ix). A fourth and final faction and the largest contingent of all believed that war would never happen because the cowards on the other side would just run away.

Throughout his treatment, Thomas's informal style is engaging as he moves from first person to third and back again. His seminar-like approach works nicely as he quotes himself from earlier works and effortlessly integrates the contributions of other historians, demonstrating his easy command of the secondary literature. Thomas worries at one point about "anachronistic applications," but the reader is treated to countless references to historical analogies and modern day examples. The reader can expect to find parallels to "don't ask, don't tell," mosh pits, Abu Ghraib and Andersonville, the Viet Cong, the Iraq wars, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban. There are lessons to be learned from these historic antecedents. Additionally, Thomas is happy to posit a number of questions and leave them unanswered; the "think book" works on a number of levels.

Thomas examines the senior military leadership of both sides through a series of penetrating sketches and concludes that most military experts understood what a long and costly war this might be, but amazingly, most politicians did not consult or take their advice when they did. In particular, Winfield Scott's advice was broadly dismissed as too political; the general offered his president four options: accept the Crittenden Compromise, guaranteeing slavery and therefore avoiding war; avoid confrontation by collecting tariffs offshore; wage war by raising three hundred thousand troops over three years, leaving "fifteen devastated provinces . . . held for generations by heavy garrisons . . . and to what good?"; or allow the South to depart (42).

Thomas has parallel chapters on Lincoln and Davis. Lincoln's primary weakness was his inability to understand the southern resolve to fight. He was convinced that rank-and-file southerners would not follow the planter class and was, as a result, dismissive of secession arguments. Davis grasped better the demands of the office and, although outplayed at Fort Sumter, understood the consequences of war but felt duty and honor required him to do it. He thought the South would win with his "offensive defensive" strategy and even if conditions deteriorated over time he could always refight the American Revolution and employ guerrilla tactics as a last resort.

In a final chapter, Thomas follows that action to Bull Run. Using two regiments as his guide, the 5th Wisconsin and the 8th Georgia, Thomas charts the initial excitement and exuberance of the "phony war" through the picnics and parades to the deadly consequences of First Manassas. The "unintended consequences" of letting out the dogs of war seemed too predictable.

Throughout this volume, Thomas is quick to suggest the timeliness of an examination of the Civil War. The war still...

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