The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security by Mark L. Haas (review)

The school of realism predominately views the balance of power as the ultimate concern in pragmatic foreign-policy making. However, does realist theory jive with reality in the modern Middle East? What if Middle Eastern governments and their domestic rivals were to prioritize the advancement of ideas instead? And if they did, how should the United States interact with leaders who are at the center of the fierce ideological competition taking place in the Middle East today? As policymakers and academics ponder such questions, Mark Haas offers answers in The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security.

Haas contends that realist thought does not adequately account for the foreign policies of Middle Eastern governments or of their domestic political rivals. Addressing the gaps in realism’s applicability to the modern Middle East, particularly the incentives to form alliances, Haas introduces three hypotheses regarding the profound influence of ideology on foreign policy. A former postdoctoral fellow at Harvard who now serves as an associate professor of political science at Duquesne University, Haas also assesses the results of US foreign policy in countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although Haas’s primary claims initially may seem obvious and even unoriginal, his thoroughly researched case studies form a compelling argument.

After providing a thorough overview of the three main hypotheses and their subsets, Haas describes his methodology in chapter 1, “The Importance of Ideological Distance and Polarity to Foreign Policies.” His dependent variable is “leaders’ perception of threat and consequent security policies.” Essentially, the dependent variable is based on the willingness of governments (1) to form alliances with the leaders of other nation-states and (2) to export their own ideological values to countries where opposing ideologies are predominant. This willingness is measured qualitatively by treaties, official statements, foreign aid, use of military force, and other manifestations of foreign policy. Haas’s two independent variables are ideological distance, “the degree of ideological differences dividing decision makers from different states,” and ideological polarity, “the number of prominent ideological groups in a particular system.” Unfortunately, the overly meticulous, abstract, and occasionally bland first chapter may discourage readers from proceeding to the four case studies of politics in the Middle East since 1979, which show a strong relationship among the variables. Yet those who breach chapter 1 will be rewarded with a more comprehensive knowledge of recent Middle Eastern political history and a clearer understanding of how ideology drives foreign policy in one of the most geopolitically complex regions of the world.

According to Hypothesis 1, “ideological distances shape leaders’ assessments of others’ international intentions and the likelihood of domestic subversions.” In and of itself, the initial claim is underwhelming in its originality, but it clearly strikes at the heart of realists’ belief that the balance of power almost exclusively drives foreign policy. Throughout chapter 2, “Iranian Ideological Factions and International Policies, 1997–2009,” Haas explores the dynamic relationship between ideologically focused domestic power struggles within the arena of Iranian politics and competing parties’ respective foreign policies. If realists are correct, political leaders in Iran would have a virtually uniform view of the United States. However, Haas convincingly argues that Iran’s divided government did not produce a coherent policy constructed to maintain the balance of power.

As shown in the first case study, leading reformist Mohammed Khatami, who was Iran’s president from 1997 to 2005, admiringly described the US government as a vital ally worthy of imitation. Haas points out that Iranian reformists openly pursued cooperation and friendship with Washington, even supporting US intervention in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks. On the other hand, the damning proclamations that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei reserved for “the Great Satan” exemplify Iranian Islamists’ policy of outright opposition to US influence in the Middle East. Thus, ideological similarities were primarily responsible for liberal Iranian reformists’ pro-US foreign policy, which contrasted...