Abstract

This paper argues that next to the now widely recognized ‘externalist’ elements, Reid’s thought about belief with positive epistemic status contains a number of so-far unrecognized ‘internalist’ features. This claim is substantiated by (1) identifying a number of conditions that Reid holds beliefs of various sorts must satisfy if they are to have positive epistemic status, and by (2) arguing that, for Reid, many of these conditions are internal conditions. The conclusion is that the externalist and internalist elements in Reid form a coherent whole and that his position can, with some qualification, be classified as the conjunction of weak externalism and weak internalism.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 75-92
Launched on MUSE
2013-02-01
Open Access
No
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