The Rise of Global Powers: An Interview with Anthony D'Agostino
- The Rise of Global Powers:An Interview with Anthony D'Agostino
Why did great power dynamics become more complicated and competitive in the era of the world wars?
As I see it, the scramble for Africa and the scramble for concessions on the China coast seemed to culminate in a scramble for the world, coming to a head in World War I. Then, after the globalized world economy built around the gold standard went into collapse in the 1930s, a second war finished the sorting out among the powers. It was the end of European imperialism and also the end of European great power politics, but this did not result until the eclipse of Britain and France in the 1940s. Even so, the interwar period introduced an entirely new etiquette to international politics. In the period before the Great War, the annexation of territories outside Europe was almost a matter of routine. It was assumed that when a power made an acquisition, another power, if it truly enjoyed the status of a Great Power, was entitled to claim compensation. When the British took Cyprus in 1878, they had to promise Tunis to the French; when the French agreed to stay out of the Russo-Japanese War, their compensation was Morocco. When the French eventually took Morocco, the Germans wanted compensation. In the interwar period this sort of thing fell away before the Wilsonian "New Diplomacy," according to which such acquisitions became acts of aggression and challenges to the international system. In the 19th century actions like the Italian war in Ethiopia or the Japanese taking Manchuria would have been much less note worthy. So imperialism, although it had a long way to go, had already essentially lost its rigor and legitimacy, at least in terms of the conventions of great power politics.
When you "widen the focus to Eurasia," what sorts of understandings of the interwar period emerge?
I am just trying to give some attention to things other than Anglo-German relations, Versailles, and the economic problems associated with Germany recovery, and to put these into a slightly larger context. Not at all to deny their importance, but to consider, for [End Page 22] example, the Soviets and their policy of National Bolshevism, that is, making common cause with anything that cuts against "Entente imperialism." That meant Soviet support for Kemal's Turkey against the Greeks and eventually against the British, or encouragement of Persia in the same cause, or for Afghanistan in invading India in 1919, or for the Kuomintang in staging the Northern March in 1926, or even for German nationalism in 1932. As some historians have pointed out, this little Anglo-Soviet cold war persisted through the 1920s and no doubt contributed to the British estimate of the Soviets as part of the problem, rather than, as they eventually proved to be, part of the solution. When the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty ended in 1927, the Soviets answered by the collectivization of agriculture, which changed their regime from top to bottom. Or one could take note of the Middle East and Anglo-French tension over the renegotiation of the Sykes-Picot treaty that gave Mosul to the French in 1916. This no doubt added an element of rancor to the discussions of Poincaré and Curzon about guarantees to France against Germany, discussions which turned out badly for the French. And there was the continuing problem of the Japanese and whether to treat them as an ally, as the British hoped, or as a problem, as the United States assumed. And it doesn't end there.
How significant were the tensions among Great Britain, France, and the United States in the interwar period?
The antagonism in Anglo-French relations caused a concern, undue in my opinion, about French "hegemony" in Europe and the pursuant thought of balancing France by assisting the German revision of the Versailles pact. The French thought that the British had sabotaged their invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 by a secret attack on the franc. This led to French attacks on the pound, rather similar in...
