A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (review)

Colleen Murphy provides us with an original, nuanced, well-written, and analytically incisive diagnosis of how political relationships fail and what it takes to fix them. This is an important and timely book furthering both our understanding of what counts, normatively, as a healthy polity and what can be done practically to nurse war-torn communities back to health. Murphy argues that three aspects of political relationships are damaged during conflict and under repressive government: the idea of the rule of law, political trust, and citizens' basic capabilities. The erosion of each category harms our ability to act as moral agents and to base our relationships with fellow citizens on reciprocal exchange. Hence, the creation (occasionally recreation) of relationships expressing these values is the goal of reconciliation processes. The three categories are closely related and are mutually reinforcing in the process of repairing such relationships.

The analysis of the first category draws on Lon Fuller's famous account of the rule of law. Murphy provides us here with an insightful analysis of how violations of the ideal, by undermining the stability and predictability of the public sphere, breed resentment and make it impossible for people to practically plan out their lives.

Following Karen Jones, Murphy describes trust as "an attitude of optimism with respect to the competence and will of the trustee."¹ She explains the importance of "trust responsiveness"—the propensity of a trustee to act as trusted because she is trusted. Political trust in fellow citizens consists in optimism about their ability to follow rules, play fair, harbor no ill will to other citizens, and remain loyal to a legitimate political order. Trusting officials requires optimism about their ability to identify the appropriate grounds for official action, confidence that they do not unfairly favor one part of the community, and faith that they are willing to abide by rules restricting their power.² A community in which default trust and trust responsiveness exist between the citizens and between the citizens and officials is one in which mutual respect and reciprocity are possible.³

In her discussion of political capabilities, Murphy focuses on four potentialities that are undermined by political conflict: the capability of being respected, of being recognized as a member of a political community, of being an effective participant in the economic, social, and political life of the community, and of possessing the capabilities necessary for surviving and avoiding poverty. All of these are instrumental for autonomy and constitutive of our best conceptions of justice.⁴

This framework gives us an outstanding diagnostic tool for assessing how political relationships fail. Furthermore, it provides practical as well as normative guidance for shaping reconciliation processes. Political reconciliation processes that are sensitive to such guidance can generate hope and acknowledgement of past wrongs and the need for repair. These in turn complete the virtuous circle by enabling further advances in the three areas described.

The last two chapters of the book focus on two central transitional institutions—truth commissions and war crime tribunals. I shall devote the remainder of my remarks to this discussion.

Murphy argues that if such transitional institutions are set up well, each can make a significant contribution to processes of political reconciliation. "Truth commissions," she writes, "can contribute to political reconciliation by fostering respect for moral agency."⁵ They can change the narratives by which political communities understand themselves and develop more inclusive accounts of membership. They can help convey that "the people who suffer[ed] matter."⁶ The defense of truth commissions on these grounds is very compelling. Such bodies do have the merit of focusing on victims far more than traditional war crime tribunals (consider, for example, that during the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission the commissioners and the audience were required to stand up when the victims entered the facility, reversing the traditional custom that has all parties stand when the judges enter a court). The South African...