Hope as a Virtue in an Aristotelian Context

Michael Barilan’s article “From Hope in Palliative Care to Hope as a Virtue and a Life Skill” is an interesting and informative contribution to the debate on the nature of ‘a good death.’ Broadly speaking, the author seeks to explore “the roles and meanings of promotion focus goals in human life” and how hope can aid in alleviating suffering (Barilan 2012, 171). The subject is topical and courtesy of being clinically active, Barilan is able to add a welcome perspective.

Very briefly, the article sets out to develop a more inclusive idea of hope, involving ‘personal freedom’ and ‘valuation.’ for example, and then proceeds to explore the role of hope, in this version, for the patients in palliative care (Barilan 2012). In doing this, Barilan comes to question the often made assumption that there is a conflict between truth telling and optimism. It is argued that not only do humans have the capacity to feel (a certain type of) hope even in the face of certain death but, and perhaps more controversially, that to do so is both good for us and likely to improve the period spent in palliative care. The arguments draw on ideas from ‘the ethics of care’ as well as ‘virtue ethics.’ Barilan, rightly to my mind, is careful to stay clear of religious perspectives as he seeks to conceptualize hope as: (i) A virtue, (ii) rational, and (iii) something that “articulates some unique philosophical ideas and is appropriate to broader discourses in morals, psychology, and palliative care” (Barilan 2012, 166).

Although being a worthwhile project, it is also a very ambitious one, and I will comment but briefly on a few aspects that I find of particular interest. Notably, all comments should be understood as coming from a philosophical, as opposed to a legal, perspective and, further, although it is not specified I take it that Barilan considers hope a primarily epistemic virtue.

A Sketch of a Possible Aristotelian Position on ‘Hope’ as a Virtue

Barilan connects hope with care and seeks to place his account within an Aristotelian framework (broadly conceived of). Although his study is not exegetic, this is nonetheless a substantial undertaking and there are a number of reasons for why this could prove problematic. A prime obstacle is that neither hope, nor care, are recognized as virtues proper by Aristotle. When Aristotle does address hope, it is frequently in the context of courage and how hope sometimes can act as a contributor to the virtue of courage. Moreover, hope is often described in negative terms and said to cause agents to feel inappropriately confident and trigger vicious self-delusion. Barilan, on the other hand, approaches hope as something intrinsically valuable and perhaps even necessary to the leading of a good life (or the ending of it as it were). Although this might well be the case it is not clear that this is best supported by the Aristotelian account (e.g., see NE book 3 and Rhetoric book 2). To be fair to Barilan, however, he acknowledges this and admits that, “Exegesis, philology, and historiography are not the main concerns of this work,” adding that he has been inspired by ‘the ethics of care’ (Barilan 2012, 167).

Such reservations aside, I do find the approach most interesting and would like to propose an alternative (potentially more promising) way to place hope in an Aristotelian virtue theory. The suggestion is, very briefly, that both hope and care could be accommodated within an Aristotelian as well as a modern virtue ethics framework, but that this is best explained by reference to the role of the self-regarding aspects of (some) of the virtues. Despite being more interested in the practical than the theoretical (e.g., Barilan favors a bottom-up approach and the talking of hope in ordinary language), I believe that the following could lend support to his claims.

On exploring self-care as a candidate for virtue, Barilan moves on to how it can be balanced with care for others (in these passages he refers to Sternberg 1998...