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  • Where the “They” LiesFeminist Reflection on Pedagogical Innovation
  • Andrea Janae Sholtz

As feminist philosophers attempt to articulate problems of marginalization based on race, class, gender, sexuality, we navigate a complex and confusing set of paradigms of exclusion and inclusion. A significant barrier is that binary logic is difficult to eradicate even in calls for greater inclusivity, and the language and mentality of “us” versus “them,” where “them” indicates an imposing force, social institution, or privileged section of the population “doing” something to the “us” remains. Pedagogically, this poses a difficulty in that, often, we are teaching not the marginalized but those who may feel themselves implicated as the “They.” Either as male, white, financially well-off, American, politically conservative, or some combination thereof, students who are presented with these critical materials many times bridle under the supposed accusing eye of the text. Closing the distance from the immediate rejection of the material and to a genuine encounter is the key issue. The question is how can one thoughtfully model critical practice that engages students rather than constructing them as the “They”?

What is the nature of the “They”? How can references to the “They” be anything other than gross generalizations? Martin Heidegger has a robust conceptual understanding of the “They” as an existential possibility of Dasein. Dasein initially, and for the most part, understands itself as composed of everyday interpretations of the world indicative of the “they-self.” Significantly, everydayness also constitutes a mode of relating to others, that of indifference or passing each other by (Heidegger 1996, 116). Heidegger calls this the [End Page 72] inauthentic mode of Dasein, juxtaposing this to Dasein’s authentic existence, which is not simply a move toward a greater individuality but toward the “We.” Aside from providing a theoretical platform for discussing the problematic of the “us/them” binary, the transformation in attunement that leads beyond the “They” toward the “We” has important ethical implications, which I will link to feminist Gloria Anzaldúa’s understanding of mestiza consciousness. Their similarity consists in the emphasis on a new mode of thinking as a necessary condition for moving away from the superficiality of thought that hinders us from truly encountering each other and our world/s.

Heidegger argues that we are indebted to a philosophical legacy that takes the subject as the primary basis of analysis, separating it from the surrounding world to determine its traits and characteristics. We are unable to see that a “subject without a world ‘is’ not initially and is also never given” (Heidegger 1996, 109). The “who” of Dasein is never reached, because we fail to think through what it actually means to be in the world. In Being and Time, chapter 4, “Being-in-the-world as Being-With and Being a Self: the They,” Heidegger discusses Dasein as a relational Self. Making sense of the inextricable link between these terms clarifies the “who of Dasein,” and, by association, who the “They” is.

Dasein is, first and foremost, Being-in-the-world, where world indicates the referential totality of significance. We are never in the world in isolation, therefore Mitdasein (Being-with-others) is implicit to Being-in-the-world and an existential condition of Dasein. Dasein shares a world (now a Mitwelt) irrevocably. Sharing a world with others seems so obvious that we do not take the time to interrogate what it actually entails. This, in turn, conceals the very effort to understand the “who” of Dasein, requiring analysis of how we are with other Daseins.

Heidegger begins by interrogating everyday existence. Heidegger says that deficiency and averageness characterize everyday being with one another and misleads us to interpret Mitdasein as a pure objective presence of several subjects, dividing “us” from them. The subject of everydayness is the “They.” The “They” is typically understood as not myself, but this is where one would be mistaken in terms of Heidegger’s analysis. In a passage crucial to understanding Mitdasein, Heidegger writes, “The ‘others’ does not mean everybody else but me—those from whom the I distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too” (Heidegger...

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