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  • Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens' Political Behavior
  • E. Ike Udogu
al-Werfalli, Mabroka . 2011. Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens' Political Behavior. New York: Ithaca Press. 216 pp. $69.73 (cloth).

Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens' Political Behavior, authored by Mabroka al-Werfalli, is made up of lists of tables and figures, a glossary, a preface, acknowledgements, six chapters, a conclusion, an afterword, a bibliography, an appendix, and an index.

The book's thesis revolves around the issue of political alienation in the North African nation of Libya. The book brings to the fore two major concerns that have engaged the philosophy and scholarship of some Africanists on the matter of the legitimacy of the state in postcolonial Africa. It is, indeed, the case that in much of contemporary African politics it is often difficult to separate the state from the leader. In this context, the ensuing question is this: to what extent did the character of Colonel Qaddafi himself advance political alienation in Libyan society?

As in many African polities, the assumption is that Qaddafi was Libya, and that Libya was Qaddafi—just as Robert Mugabe is Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe is Mugabe; Paul Biya is Cameroon, and Cameroon is Biya; and so on. A second query that emerges is whether, to further the state's legitimacy, citizens should be politically devoted to the nation-state (as in nationalism) or to the individual leader. For instance, before his death during the recent rebellion, Colonel Qaddafi claimed that "my people love me"—not that the people loved Libya so much that they would defend it without him being in power. It is around the foregoing queries and discursive conjectures that this book should be visualized.

In chapter one, "Surveying Opinion in a Suppressive Milieu," al-Werfalli provides the empirical foundation on which the analyses and conclusion in this text are made. They include a survey of citizens' attitudes toward the state that was conducted in Al-Orouba, with a population of approximately 85,000, in the region of Benghazi (found on pages 3, 6-10; 195-205). The author further narrates the herculean task of conducting a "meaningful" survey in a repressive society, in which researchers are generally viewed with suspicion.

Chapter two, "The Quest for Legitimacy," is used by al-Werfalli to historicize his analysis. The Libyan state lacked political legitimacy following "native" resistance to the occupation of the territory by the Ottoman Empire (p. 11). Readers learn that the reign of the monarchy did not change matters either, while the author alludes to the tactics adopted by the military junta after the 1969 coup d'état to advance the regime's support. The author points out that the stratagem applied by the administration was revolutionary legitimacy, which justified the acts undertaken by Colonel Qaddafi to rationalize his continuing in power indefinitely. The other mode with which to advance his political legitimacy was socioeconomic performance (dubbed eudaemonic), seen as a legitimation ploy on which most authoritarian regimes relied, especially when resources are considered plentiful. This [End Page 120] method of operation is based upon the role of government in providing social and economic benefits to its citizens (pp. 12, 19).

Meanwhile, other approaches adopted by Qaddafi to further his legitimacy, and not necessarily that of the state itself, included charismatic and foreign policy. He saw himself as the reincarnation, and heir in the Arab world, of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, especially as he championed the dogma of Arab nationalism (p. 26). He did so almost like the enigmatic Russian Rasputin by deluding himself as one endowed with supernatural, superhuman, and exceptional powers (pp. 22-23).

Chapter three, "Aspects of Political Support," addresses the measure of support the regime had from the survey's outcomes. In particular, al-Werfalli studies the extent to which individuals attended meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses (BPCs), a political component of the regime. Whereas attendance was high in the late 1970s (65%), it dropped substantially in the early 1990s (to 27%), and it continued to dwindle (as shown on p. 53). This development suggested a deficiency of enthusiasm in the system and a lack of trust in the government...

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