Autonomous "I" of an Intersectional Self

Introduction: Worries About Autonomy

Autonomy, or self-governance, seems to require the possibility that human selves are capable of independence, in some sense, from natural and social conditions. Some views of autonomy seem to suggest that there has to be a core, "true self," that remains self-transparent and untouched by causal and social relations. But the self is clearly not isolated from others; indeed, it is hard to see how any self, let alone an autonomous self, could develop without a great deal of causal help from others; selves are what Baier and Code call "second persons." ¹ Competencies such as critical self-reflection that are taken to be central to the capacity for and exercise of autonomy depend on socialization, that is, both on the training and shaping of personal habits and skills and on a social environment that encourages and rewards the exercise of those skills. ² This is the case even though social norms, institutions, practices, and relationships can also limit the range of significant options available and constrain the agency and freedom of the self. ³

These concerns have led some to question how it is possible to reconcile the possibilities of self-definition and self-direction that the notion of autonomy has recurrently represented in Western thought with a recognition of the impact of socialization on creating a self and conditioning its choices. Others have argued that the notion of autonomy should be jettisoned altogether as representing a false ideal ⁴ or that its value should be qualified because it ignores the reality and importance of relationships, dependency relations in particular. ⁵

Some have proposed that the very notion of the self has to be reconceived. The thought is that perhaps a self has no unitary identity but is multiple, an intersectional self (typically made up of race, class, gender, occupation, ethnicity, language, and so on). ⁶ But if the self is relational or intersectional, what happens to the notion of an "I" as some kind of independent power or perspective? If we are not going to jettison the notion of autonomy altogether, it seems that some such notion is required if any claims are to be made about the possibility of functioning as an agent. Yet, if the self is an intersectional self, a relational self, in what sense could it be said to have such power of independence and autonomy? For this is just what the intersectional self seems to rule out.

I explore resources in the work of George Herbert Mead, Josiah Royce, and Justus Buchler for formulating a conception of the self that acknowledges its social and relational aspects while at the same time articulating what it might mean to say that such a self has a reflexive and thus self-directing (or self-governing) capacity, that is, can function as an autonomous "I."

Briefly,

1. Mead's notion of the "me" and the "I" provides a starting point for understanding the social locatedness of an agential self;
2. Royce's notion of interpretation suggests a way to articulate a process of self-mediation;
3. Buchler's notion of a relational judicative self incorporates and expands on Mead's framework, and his concept of reflexive communication develops the Roycean idea of interpretation such that a self has the capacity for self-defining projection into the future, that is, the capacity to function as an autonomous "I."

Finally, I should add that I am here interested in the notion of individual (or personal) autonomy. I am not developing a normative analysis of the value of autonomy, nor an analysis of a normative conception of autonomy as moral or "principled" autonomy.

1. The Social Locatedness of an Agential Self

George Herbert Mead argues that the self consists of a "me" and an "I." The "me" is the self as the generalized other, that is, is the self as a reflection of the whole community. It is the attitude of the community, the...