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The Americas 60.2 (2003) 249-272



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The Spanish Colonial Military:
Santo Domingo 1701-1779*

Christine Rivas
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

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It is generally recognized that the grave military reverses of 1762 impelled Charles III "to place his American Empire on a competitive military footing." A crucial element in this process was the "expansion of the regular, or veteran garrisons. . . ." 1 This is not to say, of course, that there were no military establishments in the Indies before the Seven Years War. Indeed, as Allan J. Kuethe points out:

Ferdinand VI (1746-1759) had inherited from his father, Philip V (1700-1759) a promising defense system that had to its credit a dramatic victory over the British at Cartagena in 1741. But misplaced confidence arising from that very triumph . . . lulled Ferdinand into an unimaginative perpetuation of his father's system. . . . 2

Yet, how different was this "promising defense system" from that put into place after 1762?

On Hispaniola, and more specifically in the fortified city of Santo Domingo, the military began undergoing progressive reforms in the early years of Bourbon rule. 3 The fall of Havana certainly quickened the pace of [End Page 249] preparedness, but the difference was quantitative rather than qualitative. There is also ample evidence that the experience and general behavior of the officers' corps changed very little after the Bourbon Reforms. Military reform effort on the island was a slow bureaucratic process flowing from early Bourbon initiatives—measures that have been inadequately studied but were effective in their own terms. The pace merely quickened after 1762.

From the seventeenth century onward, Santo Domingo survived on irregularly received Mexican situados. Between shipments, the colony relied on loans coaxed from the local elite. 4 White influence dominated, but the castes and blacks accounted for most of the sparse population. 5 The Church provided few job opportunities. Dominicans could be found on the cabildo eclesiástico, but the post of Archbishop, which was the Primate See of the Americas, was largely a peninsular preserve. The city of Santo Domingo itself had only two parishes. 6 Opportunities for royal civil service were equally scarce. Only two native sons served on the audiencia. 7 The elaborate caja, estanco, and aduana bureaucracies established in other Spanish colonies in the eighteenth century were almost nonexistent. Santo Domingo lacked support staff, as did other areas, but there were no more than 52 such posts in all. 8 Various factors limited private pursuits. Agriculture did not prosper because of a lack of markets. Restrictive rules of trade, the failure of the Barcelona Company, an ineffective Asiento (which never produced an adequate number of black slaves), and frequent disruptions because of warfare all played a role in limiting exports. 9 In addition, the privateering policy pursued [End Page 250] by the Crown before 1739, while profitable in itself, restricted trade. 10 The legal livestock trade with authorized ports never profited as much as trade with the unrecognized French colony on the western part of the island. 11 In any event, constant diplomatic disputes and border incidents hindered livestock trade. 12 Economic life was, on the whole, not promising. Inevitably, the military represented the most significant source of dignified public employment. In 1763, Dominicans held 46.1 percent of the officerships in the fijo of the capital. 13

Although the fijo was the centerpiece of Dominican defense, only one existed on the entire island. 14 The need for a fixed battalion seemed self-evident. It was responsible for defending the plaza from invasions. Its duties also included protecting the raya from French encroachments and patrolling the northern and southern coasts, which had been largely abandoned in the depopulation policy of 1605-06. 15 It also kept general order in the city and the interior. 16 With regard to the interior, special quinteños on detached service patrolled the hinterland to avoid a revolt of the free black population. 17 Lastly, senior officers provided training for the militia units so that those men could be used to fill any temporarily vacant position in the fijo. 18

The relative...

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