Sex, Fear, and Greed: A Social Dilemma Analysis of Gender and Cooperation

Results from previous studies have led many researchers to conclude that sex has no effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. This article reconciles strong theoretical expectations of sex differences in cooperation with the dearth of empirical evidence for such differences. I show that several theories of sex- or gender-related behavior suggest we should expect males and females to respond more strongly to greed and fear, respectively, in social dilemmas. I argue that previous research has failed to find differences because researchers have consistently used the Prisoner's Dilemma game (or its public goods variants) to investigate whether sex affects cooperation. Because Prisoner's Dilemma contains both fear and greed, the theories outlined in this article predict no sex differences in cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma. A series of hypotheses about the conditions under which sex affects cooperation are proposed and tested against the results of two new studies. Results from both studies support two of the three hypotheses. I conclude by discussing some implications of the findings for collective action and inequality and by suggesting directions for future research.