China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (review)

As the title clearly indicates, this book is about China and the two Vietnam Wars. More specifically, it is about China's active participation in every stage of Vietnam's struggle for independence, both in war and in peace talks during the twenty-five year period from 1950 to 1975. In this fresh study of the subject, Qiang Zhai, who has published several articles on this topic, argues that Chinese support was substantial and essential for Vietnam's final victory over the French as well as its eventual success in driving out the Americans. However, Chinese assistance was not provided without a consideration of its own self-interest. The cooperative spirit exhibited by the Chinese was tempered by a heightened vigilance against the Vietnamese hegemonic tendency in Indochina. By placing Sino-Vietnam relations in "the historical, domestic, and international contexts" (p. 1), Zhai reveals, analyzes, and evaluates China's motives in its Indochina policy, as well as its aspirations and limitations. Heavily dependent on materials from China, many of which have not been previously used, Zhai offers us a history of the Vietnam Wars that has not been fully explored before—a history that highlights the Chinese connection.

The nine chapters that follow a foreword by John Lewis Gaddis and a brief introduction are arranged chronologically, but they do not merely recount past events. Rather, the book offers a sophisticated analysis that seeks to shed light on the complex relationship between China and Vietnam—one of cooperation, disagreement, betrayal, and eventual bloody fighting. This analysis is done in the context of a global Cold War where China, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the United States interacted. Focusing on China's motives and conduct, Zhai examines Mao's visions and ambitions, and how they were implemented by his loyal associates. This study of China's behavior in the twenty-five year period covered sheds fresh light on the motives—ideological, political, and personal—underlying the shaping of China's Indochina policy.

The first two chapters reveal the deep roots of Sino-Vietnamese relations and describe Vietnam's first war, with the French. Chapter 1 traces the beginning of contact between the Chinese Communists and Ho Chi Minh, which was characterized both by Ho's dedication to "labor and peasant movements in South China" in the 1920s (p. 10) and by a personal tie developed between the Chinese leaders and Ho. That the Chinese would be the first openly to support Ho's declaration of independence in 1950 signified China's commitment to a global anti-imperialist movement, represented in this case by the Vietnamese struggle against the French; it also showed China's loyalty to a trusted friend. Aid, advisers, and materials from China would follow, and this ensured the Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu. The following chapter reveals the degree and the extent of China's involvement in the preparation and conduct of the Dien Bien Phu campaign. In his assessment of China's role, Zhai points out that "Beijing sent some of its most capable generals," who helped Vietnam "professionalize and politicize its army, reorganize its administrative structure, establish a sound financial policy, and mobilize the masses. The Chinese advisers actually planned and often helped direct Viet Minh operations, and there was a direct transmission of strategy and tactics from China to Vietnam" (p. 63). Clearly China's assistance was indispensable in Vietnam's victory over French colonial rule. However, China's help came at a price. At the ensuing peace talks in Geneva, the Chinese delegation, led by Premier Zhou Enlai, put an emphasis on a peaceful international environment. To avoid the internationalization of the Indochina conflict, the Chinese pressured their North Vietnamese comrades to postpone their dream of an immediate unification with the South. This greatly displeased the North Vietnamese, sowing the seeds of future disputes.

Chapters...