Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israeli Alliance (review)

Book Reviews 145 Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israeli Alliance, by Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv. New York: Hyperion, 1994. 537 pp. $27.95. Friends in Deed is a popular history of the U.S.-Israeli relationship since 1948, by two well-known journalists who have collaborated on several earlier works: Melman is a political and defense commentator for the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, Raviv is a correspondent for CBS News. The book has the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of popular journalism . On the one hand, it is a pleasant and easy read: breezy, well-written, chock full offascinating anecdotes. On the other, it breaks no new ground in either its historical narrative or its interpretations, and it is not particularly analytical. The major theme is familiar. Despite many differences, the United States and Israel have a "unique partnership," one of "the strongest, if strangest, in history" (p. xiv). The key components of the alliance are the commonJudeo-Christian heritage, Christian fascination with the Holy land as well as guilt over the Holocaust, shared democratic values, shared strategic objectives, the strong pro-Israel if not "philo-semitic" attitudes of most American presidents, and the power of American Jews in the U.S. political system. Israel has benefited greatly by the alliance: since 1948 the United States has provided almost $100 billion in public and private economic assistance to Israel, has been the main source of its advanced military technology, has provided the most reliable and indispensable diplomatic support of Israel, and has a de facto commitment to prevent the destruction of Israel, as was demonstrated with the dispatch of American-manned Patriot missiles to Israel in the Gulf War. On the other hand, the relationship is hardly without its strains, especially when American and Israeli national interests diverge. On such occasions, the authors claim, the United States can and has usually imposed its will on Israel, even without twisting its arm, for Israel has learned that "if America's vital interests are imperiled, the Israelis will do best by stepping aside and letting the United States exercise its prerogatives as a superpower" (p. 4). The two sides of the relationship came dramatically together in the Gulf War. The Bush administration successfully pressed Israel not to engage in a preemptive attack on Iraq during the build-up to Desert Storm and then to refrain from retaliating against Iraq after the Scud attacks on Israel, so long as no chemical weapons were used and Israeli casualties remained low. In return, American military power removed the most dangerous offensive weapons from Israel's dangerous and powerful enemy, and American Patriot missile teams were dispatched to Israel in an effort 146 SHOFAR Spring 1995 Vol. 13, No.3 (largely unsuccessful, as we now know) to shoot down incoming Scud missiles. However, far from being grateful to the Bush administration-which also strongly supported the resettlement of Russian Jews in Israel and secretly worked with Israeli intelligence in the successful effort to spirit Ethiopian Jews into Israel-the Shamir government demanded large increases in U.S. aid as payment for Israel's not undermining the international coalition in the Gulf War, and soon thereafter engaged in a bitter fight with the Bush administration because of its refusal to provide unconditional loan guarantees to Israel if the money was used to further settlement in the occupied territories~ Moreover, Shamir's rage at the Administration-which went so far that at least some members of the Israeli cabinet referred to key Jewish aides to Secretary of State James Baker as "self-hating Jews" or "Baker's Jew-boys"-was shared by AIPAC officials in the United States and other "leaders" of the American Jewish community. The authors not only fail to comment on this astonishing chutzpah- "what have you done for me lately?"-but at several points seem to come close to identifying with it, as when they write that "Despite acting as friends in deed, by going out of their way to cooperate with the United States, Israel's leaders felt they had little to show for it" (p. 404). A serious critical analysis ofthe U.S.-Israeli relationship would at least take cognizance...