Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO (review)

Book Reviews 139 consciousness to the kinds of questions that shake our "taken for granted" assumptions about women and their Jewish identity. Debra Renee Kaufman Department of Sociology Northeastern University Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO, by Barry Rubin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. 261 pp. $24.95. Barry Rubin states in the preface to Revolution Until Victory? that this work is "intended to be an analytical political history of the PLO, investigating and interpreting its political circumstances, strategies and doctrines" (p. xiii). Having spent two years researching the foreign policy dynamics of this particular organization for a doctoral dissertation, I appreciated the monumental task that Rubin would have shouldered to produce a work of such magnitude. The "analytical political history" that Rubin delivers, however, fails to merit academic recognition from this reviewer due to its neglect of scholarly analysis and lack of equal commitment to careful investigation and objective interpretation. In place of an analytical perspective, Rubin remains preoccupied with the earlier "terrorist" side of the PLO and its alleged perpetual intent to destroy the "Jewish State," contrary to what the organization and its leadership might otherwise demonstrate. In fact, the history of the PLO that Rubin renders is fraught with a serious misinterpretation of data, incomplete and inaccurate quotations, the misrepresentation of policy positions held by key actors in the region, and blatant factual errors. For example, Rubin maintains that in 1971 the Eighth Palestine National Council (PNC) endorsed a plan advanced by the Democratic Front for the liberation of Palestine (DFLP) that was supposed to "counter" the PLO's depiction as a terrorist organization. The plan involved the establishment of a "free and democratic society in Palestine for all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews ..." (p. 40). Although Rubin correctly identified the DFLP as the harbinger of this specific change in PLO strategy, he attributes approval for the plan to the wrong PNC. Contrary to what Rubin professed, it was not the Eighth PNC which first endorsed the idea of forming a secular democratic society [italics added] in Palestine once total liberation had been achieved. Rather, this strategy was given official endorsement at the Fifth PNC convened two years earlier in February 1969. Unlike the Fifth PNC, the Eighth endorsed 140 SHOFAR Spring 1995 Vol. 13, No.3 the establishment of a "democratic Palestinian state [italics added] in which all who wish to do so can live in peace with the same rights and obligations...." A more thorough reading of the documents aided by competent editing should have averted this type of mistake. More important, what Rubin overlooks is the change in PLO strategy from society to state and the myriad factors that influenced this modification . In addition, the author never addresses the subtle tactical changes that occurred from one PNC session to the next. Citing armed struggle as one example, Rubin fails to analyze the PNC-endorsed changes in this method from that ofsole means to liberation in 1968, toprincipal in 1971, foremost in 1974, culminating in the rejection ofarmed struggle altogether in 1988. Rubin's failure to analytically investigate these issues detracts fcom the stated purpose of his book. As part of Rubin's effort to prove the "radicalism" of West Bank Palestinians he relies on data from the AI-Fair public opinion poll conducted in 1986. The poll, however, cannot claim to represent West Bank public opinion exclusively because both West Bank and Gaza Palestinians participated in the survey. Additionally, Rubin's summary of the poll is inaccurate. According to the official poll results published in AlFair on 12 September, 29.6 percent indicated that if a Palestinian state were established they would choose a governmental system based on Arab nationalism and Islam [italics added]. Rubin, however, declares that "30 percent endorsed the PLO's position that the state should be based on Arab and Palestinian nationalism [italics added]" (p. 161). Ignoring the minor difference in percentage points, the choice of Arab and Palestinian nationalism as a governmental system was not an option for selection among those listed in the questionnaire. Furthermore, while Rubin affirms that 53 percent of those polled preferred an Islamic state, the official poll results reveal...