British Jewry and the Holocaust (review)

126 SHOFAR Spring 1995 Vol. 13, No.3 British Jewry and the Holocaust, by Richard Bolchover. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 208 pp. £24.95. Richard Bolchover's examination of British Jewry's reactions to the Holocaust offers a critical analysis of the actions of the organized Jewish community. Less concerned with the chronology of actions, Bolchover contends that a study of reactions and rhetoric can apprise us of the nature of attitudes within Anglo-Jewry, its "organizational and sociopolitical philosophy" (p. 1). The study is not about the Holocaust, but rather, "a contribution to the understanding of Anglo-Jewry" (p. 1). Most ofthe information available to the Anglo-Jewish community came via the press-both Jewish and general. Earlier studies by Martin Gilbert, Andrew Sharf, and Bernard Wasserstein explore the range and quality of reporting on the Holocaust and the events leading up to it, and conclude that highly accurate and detailed information was available. Scholars such as Yehuda Bauer, however, have argued that psychological barriers, or a cognitive gap, limited the ability of the public to absorb the true implications of the accounts they received. Some groups, among them the ultra-orthodox and Zionist Revisionists, did respond, leading Bolchover to question the adequacy of the cognitive gap theory. These groups were small, non-conformist, and virtually powerless, and lacked ties to others who were also willing to voice protest. Thus, it was possible not only to understand but to ac( with more determination than did the major communal bodies such as the Jewish Board of Deputies, the World Jewish Congress, and the Anglo-Jewish Association. These groups were typical ofpost-emancipa(ion westernJewry, which defined itself almost exclusively as a religious community. As such, Anglo-jewry did not confront issues "outside (he religious sphere" (p. 25). In contrast to mainstream organizations, Bolchover argues that those on the margin lacked (he socio-political cons(raints that hindered AngloJewry 's key communal organizations. Bolchover asks how it is possible, given the extensive information available, to account for the limited response. Controversially, he asserts that the Holocaust was a low priority on the communal agenda. Rather, the leaders of the Jewish community spent most of their time on internal conflicts over Zionism (which Bolchover sees as lacking distinct ideological underpinnings), the power struggle between the old guard leadership and the immigrants who aspired to leadership roles (manifested largely in a battle for control of the Board of Deputies), and a preoccupation with domestic antisemi(ism, and even irs internalization (and (hus a focus on defense tha( encouraged a low profile among refugees, especially German). Book Reviews 127 They failed, asserts Bolchover, to exploit the tradition of liberalism, which should have provided a greater sense of the validity of protest against British government policy. And, importantly, established Jewry believed itself bound by an emancipation contract which granted civic equality in return for the renunciation ofJewish national identity and ideologies. This in turn led the Jewish leadership to stress their patriotism and gratitude to Britain; Jewish writing of the period was highly apologetic in tone. Despite the fact that non-Jewish Britons no longer subscribed to this contract, Anglo-Jewry feared that a '''return' ... to adopting specific sectarianJewish demands," i.e. the abrogation of the contract, would undoubtedly result in antisemitism, something that Jews then would be bringing upon themselves. How did Jews respond to news about the Nazi atrocities? According to Bolchover the basic approaches were philanthropic and a faith in moral denunciation, non-political forms of response. Tragically, these were totally inadequate to stem Nazi persecutions, and when their futility became obvious, the community had no replacements. Jews tended to deemphasize the specifically Jewish aspect of the Nazi aggression, focusing rather on the general racial policy, avoiding confrontation with the Government, and preferring to have Christians lobby for them. Bolchover believes these strategies resulted in a sense of resignation, leading most of Anglo-Jewry to conclude that the only way to save Jews was to win the war. The dominant Jewish self-image was as powerless supplicants. While Bolchover appreciates the depth of insecurity and the policies it spawned, in the end he concludes that Jewry was unnecessarily overcautious and failed...