Judaea and Mediterranean Politics, 219 to 161 B.C.E. (review)

Book Reviews 163 edition) to Baigent and Leigh's Dead Sea Scrolls Deception (London and New York, 1991}-and by extension to some ofmy ideas-eoncerning the whole issue ofclerical involvement in and control over Dead Sea Scrolls publication and interpretation. In such matters, despite some criticism of the unfounded nature of Milik's conclusions, whose characterizations, he admits, many researchers adopted because of lack of direct access themselves to the photographs (p. 166), I think it is fairly clear where Stuckenbruck's loyalties lie. Finally, though he claims to be developing a picture of a book from Qumran sources known from the Manichaean, he gives us no picture whatsoever of what the Manichaean version of the work looked like, why, and how a relationship between Qumran and Manichaean sources might have developed-a matter that would have interested any historian or literary critic, but appears beyond the scope of Stuckenbruck 's radar altogether. Robert Eisenman Department of Religious Studies California State University Long Beach Judaea and Mediterranean Politics, 219 to 161 D.C.E., by Dov Gera. Brill Series in Jewish Studies, vol. VIII. Leiden: Brill, 1998. 362 pp. $114.50. This book has an interesting and convincing thesis. Dov Gera, a lecturer in Jewish History at Ben-Gurion University ofthe Negev, argues that seen within the context of widerpolitics in the Hellenistic Mediterranean between 219 and 161 B.C.E., events and personalities within Judaea-including even the Revolt of the Maccabees, which is enshrined in modem Israeli and American Jewish culture-were oflittle importance or impact. Three examples ofthis phenomenon-or rather, non-phenomenon-will serve to make Gera's point. First, the Jewish populace swung back and forth from supporting the Ptolemies ofEgypt to supporting the Seleucids ofSyria during the period ofintense struggle between Syria and Egypt initiated by the aggressive and talented Seleucid monarch Antiochus III and the opening ofthe Fourth Syrian War (219-216 B.C.E.). In constantly switching sides, however, the Jews were no different from the other small peoples living between Antioch and Gaza, and none ofthese peoples had much impact on the great ebb and flow ofthe Ptolemy-Seleucid struggle for power and survival. In a word, the Jews-like all the other militarily weak ethnoi-sided with whichever Greek power was the most powerful at the moment (pp. 9-35). Second, the Revolt of Jason, high priest in Jerusalem in winter 169/168 B.C.E. during the Sixth Syrian War, was not the cause ofAntiochus IV's catastrophic decision to abandon the Seleucid siege 164 SHOFAR Winter 2000 Vol. 18, No.2 ofAlexandria and retreat from Egypt. IfAntiochus Epiphanes had persisted in his siege of the Ptolemaic capital, he might well have permanently imposed his rule on all of Egypt, thus confronting the Romans with a Seleucid power now doubled in scale and resources. The Roman Republic, deeply entangled in its own difficulties with Macedon in 169, could have done little to prevent Antiochus' unification of Syria and Egyptand this development would have fundamentally altered the balance offorce within the Mediterranean. Such a Seleucid triumph might even have permanently blocked the expansion ofRoman hegemony into the Near East. But Antiochus IV's world-historical mistake of winter 169/168 (he evidently thought-wrongly-that it would be easy enough to take Alexandria next year) had little to do with any distraction caused by the Revolt of Jason. The Revolt had no wider origin than factional in-fighting within the Temple aristocracy: Jasons' forces were very small, and Antiochus certainly would not have needed to rush a large part ofhis 60,000-man army into Judaea from Egypt to deal with it (pp. 153-161). Third, the Revolt ofthe Maccabees would have had no chance of success if Antiochus IV had not died prematurely in spring 163, while seeking to impose his rule upon Iran (he was only in his forties). Indeed, the Hasmonean troubles were of so little concern to Antiochus that he took his main army off to conquer Iran long after the Revolt began, leaving Judaea to be mopped up by minor Seleucid officials. What saved the Maccabees from inevitable destruction was that Antiochus' premature death...