Abstract

By a will to truth Nietzsche understands an overriding commitment, unlimited in scope, to believing in accordance with evidence and argument. I show that the critique of this commitment found in Nietzsche’s later works uncovers the psychological grounds of our modern will to truth and establishes its affinity with distinctively moral commitments. I argue that Nietzsche’s critique nevertheless provides no answer to his question concerning the value of a will to truth in general. Nietzsche’s examination of the will to truth aims instead to establish that we presently lack any standard for determining its value.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 265-289
Launched on MUSE
2012-04-19
Open Access
No
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