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122 SHOFAR Fall 1997 Vol. 16, No.1 research showing its utility and sometimes in the face of research indicating its lack of utility. Israel's education is formally centralized but reflects the looseness, lack of discipline, flexibility, and openness to particularistic political pressures that are well known across Israel's public organizations. "Gray education," or parent-financed supplemental programming, seems to be growing alongside the slogan of universal, compulsory, and free education ideologically required in the name of equality. Integration between socio-economically disadvantaged and advantaged Jewish pupils has failed in the face of crude or sophisticated evasions by parents and school administrators, with the cooperation of Ministry of Education and local authorities supposedly operating under an explicit policy of integration. The book is a valuable addition to what is known about education in Israel and is crafted to earn a place in the literature that compares policy efforts across nations. The author's perspectives are eclectic, and his judgments ofthose who contend for influence is fair. Along with this praise, it is appropriate to indicate what is lacking: a more focused concern as to how Israel compares to other countries in the resources allocated to education and its achievements, and a survey of higher education in Israel. Both are important deficiencies. The lack of international.comparison keeps the reader from knowing how education in Israel, for all the clumsiness of its policy-making, stacks up against other countries. The lack of attention to higher education limits the author's treatment of equality versus achievement that consumes so much political energy in Israel and a great deal ofspace in his book. Some ofthe most important conflicts about equality versus achievement are fought over the resources to be granted institutions of higher education and the availability of options outside the established universities, as well as examinations used to select students for university entrance and programs in secondary schools that are designed to prepare students for higher education. Ira Sharkansky The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Professionals Against Populism: The Peres Government and Democracy, by Michael Keren. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 147 pp. $49.50 (c); $16.95 (p). The relationship between experts/professionals and power has an ancient lineage. It goes back at least to Aristotle and Alexander. Along the way that nexus has been commented upon by such notables as Aristotle, Cicero, Marx, and Weber. As expertise became a socially recognized source of authority, the relationship between experts and Book Reviews 123 power-holders increasingly became the subject ofanalYJ:ic investigations. Writing in that social science mode, Michael Keren, a professor of political science at Tel Aviv University, has produced a fascinating study ofthe knowledge-power nexus in the first (1984-86) government of Shimon Peres. Peres became Prime Minister under decidedly unfavorable circumstances. Despite Labor's early commanding lead in the polls, the 1984 parliamentary elections produced a virtual deadlock between Labor and Likud. The parliamentary crisis was resolved by a 25-member National Unity Government in which both major parties had veto power and Peres and Yitzhak Shamir, the leader ofLikud, were to rotate the positions ofPrime Minister and Foreign Minister after two years. Thus Shimon Peres had to function as Prime Minister without any semblance of a popular mandate and with significant institutionalized political constraints. The "external" circumstances confronting Peres were no less daunting. The Israeli Defense Forces were mired in Lebanon as a result of the Likud Government's ill-fated 1982 invasion. The economy was beset by a massive foreign exchange deficit and a runaway triple-digit inflation; both were undergirded by extremely popular tax cuts that encouraged the purchase of imported consumer goods. And then shortly after he became Prime Minister, Peres had to confront a major scandal involving the leadership ofIsrael's General Security Services (Shin Bet). Professor Keren utilizes Peres' actions in each problem area to analyze the relationship between professionals and governmental power. Keren argues that Peres consciously cultivated a relationship with technocrats in order to offset the populist style of politics of Likud. Peres' and Labor's strategic objectives were to weaken the appeal of populist leaders, to untie the links between domestic frustration and foreign...

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