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The Arab-Israeli Peace Process ZIONISM AT A TURNING POINT: THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS AS A PRELUDE TO A NEW ERA by Oded Neumann Oded Neumann received his Ph.D. in History from UCLA in 1993, and he is currently on the staff of Occidental College. He has ;1chieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Head of Operational Research Branch, Israel Defense Forces, and is the author of numerous classified military publications, including two books. 119 Zionist history has witnessed two major turning points since the idea of a Jewish national revival in Zion, the historical homeland, was first expressed in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. The first turning point occurred at the end of that century and included two main developments: the start of a nationally motivated Jewish return to Eretz IsraeP in 1882 and the convergence of the first Zionist Congress in Basle during the summer of 1897, which marked the movement's shift from theory into a political reality. The second turning point took place at the mid-point of the twentieth century with the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948. This event, probably more than any other element, marked the realization of one of the main goals of the movement. Since its beginning, the Jewish Yisbuv2 has been affected by the antagonism, hostility, and hatred born of Arab nationalism. IHereafter the term Eretz Israel (Hrelz Yisrael in Hebrew) serves as a definition for the territory named Western Palestine under the British mandatory rule between September 1922 and May 19-18, following the British division of the original Mandatory Palestine into Transjordan and Western Palestine. 2Yishuv is the Hebrew word for selliement or community_ As a name, it also refers most often to the Jewish community in Palestine before 1948. 120 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 The Development of an Arab Animosity Arab opposition to Zionism appeared almost immediately after the beginning of Shivat Zion3 and was aimed at Jewish settlers who became known as the Members of the First Aliyah (1882-1904). At the start of that wave of Jewish immigration the Yishuv numbered only about 26,000 people, constituting 7-8 percent of Eretz Israel's total population of about 350,000. By the end of this period the Yishuv had reached a total of 55,000 people, of whom about 5,000 were living in 25 newly established agricultural settlements.4 The first hostile Arab reaction to the Yishuv was actually a nonpolitical one characterized by the feelings of local rural Arab elements who feared that the Jewish settlements could threaten their living and their rights to the cultivated lands.5 The Second AJiyah (1904-1914) increased the Jewish Yishuv to about 85,000 people. Although Jews then became about 12 percent of the total population, this increase still did not arouse nationally motivated Arab violence. However, Arab opposition to Jewish 'settlements became more political and was expressed by wealthy, influential, urban, and better educated elements of Arab society, who were fully aware of the Jewish national aspirations for those territories. Despite this growing opposition, leaders of the Jewish Yishuv and the Zionist movement made efforts to establish contacts and create understanding with Arab leaders, especially with those who supported the idea of decentralizing the Ottoman Empire in the pre World War I era. Those efforts became even more intense after 1908,6 when the first Arab national societies were established. However, 3ShiIJat Zion means (in Hehrew) the relUrn 10 Zion. Zion is literally a Biblical name for Jerusalem and metaphorically the name for the entire land of Israel. 'Mordechai Eliav, "lntroduClion: The Uniqueness of the First Aliyah," The First Aliyah, . cd. M. Eliav (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi and Ministry of Defense, 1981), vol. 1, pp.l,,<-xvii (in Hebrew). 5Yaacov Ro'i, "Jewish-Arab Relations in the First Aliyah Settlements," The First Aliyah, vol. 1, Pl'. 245-248 (in Hebrew). 61908 was the year when the Young Turks Revolution in the Ottoman Empire began. The Young Turks era lasted from 1908 10 1918. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 121 solid fundamental agreements and understandings were not achieved at that time.7 The thirty years of the British Mandate over Eretz Israel (1918-1948),8 which followed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, were a time of ongoing and escalating violent Arab opposition to Zionism. Violence started as early as April 1920,9 and it worsened during May 1921, with assaults on additional Jewish settlements. More extensive attacks started in August 1929, of which the better remembered is the massacre of the Jewish community in Hebron. Between the years 1936-1939, owing to an increase of Jewish immigration following the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, a new wave of Arab violence developed into a full-scale Arab revolt against the British government, including frequent Arab riots and a boycott ofJewish goods and services. The revolt was suppressed, but its suppression marked the beginning of the Arab states' intervention in the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism. The involvement of the Arab states was organized by the British authorities who wanted to ease the frustrations of the Palestinian population. The leaders of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Yemen were calling for an end to the revolt and promising to carry on the struggle using diplomatic means. 10 The outhreak of World War II hrought about a short cessation in the hostile Arah activities, hut the struggle was renewed in 1944, primarily by means of propaganda. Arah pressure, beginning in 1946, .had a strong influence on Britain's decision, at the start of 1947, to force the United Nations to take responsihility for the future of Eretz Israel. The United Nations' treatment of the issue thereafter brought to an end the sixty-sixyear -long pre-statehood stage of Zionist history when the General Assembly passed resolution numher 181 (the partition resolution). A·little over six 7Based on Mordechai Na'or, ed, 77.,e Second Aliyah 1903-1914: Sources, Conclusions, Selected Cases and Assisting Materials, the Idan series, vol. IV, Rachel Yamiit Ben-Zvi Center for Studies of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1989) (in Hebrew). "The mandate over Palestine was given 10 Britain in April 1920 at the San Remo conference, The British had completed the occupation of ErelZ Israel already in September 1918. 9The Nabi Musa affair in the area of Jerusalem. "'Yaacov Shimoni, Political Dictionary ofthe Arab World (Jerusalem: Keter, 1988), pp. 340-343 (in Hebrew). 122 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, NO.1 months later, the establishment ofthe State ofIsrael was declared by David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv.11 The Jewish Yishuv grew during the British Mandate period from about 85,000 people to about 600,000, constituting at its end about one third of Eretz Israel's total population ofalmost two million people. During this era additional efforts were made to find ways for understanding between the Jewish and the Arab national movements. The most important and famous negotiation became known as the Faysal-Weizman agreement of January 1919, in which mutual recognition, good will, and understanding, together with close cooperation between the two national movements, were declared. Faysal later withdrew from the agreement under the pressures of radical Arab elements. Despite Faysal's position, such an agreement was never accepted by the official spokesmen of the Arab national movement. In any case, the Faysal-Weizman agreement was never executed and the Arab-Israel peace process had to wait a few more decades to take its first steps.J2 The next era in Zionist history started with the establishment of the State of Israel and came to an end a quarter of a century later, in the fall of 1973, with the end of the Yom Kippur War. This era can be summed up as the era of struggle over the territories of Eretz Israel. It included five wars together with countless hostile activities, the vast majority of which were expressions of the Arab rejection of the Jewish state. Violent Arab reactions to the United Nations partition resolution started the day after the resolution passed (November 30, 1947). At that stage the fighting was initiated by the local Palestinian forces and targeted Jewish transportation lines and isolated Jewish settlements. A new and unprecedented phase of Arab violence started a day after the declaration of Israel's independence (May 15, 1948). On this day units belonging to five regular Arab armies, including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, invaded the territories of the newborn state in order to prevent the establishment of an independent Jewish state. This war, called "The War of Independence" by Israel and "the disaster of 1948" by Arabs, came to an end between February and July 1949, with the signing of four "Shimoni, Political, pp. 343-3'15. 12Shimoni, Political, p. 3<11. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 123 armIstice agreements between the State of Israel and neighboring countries. J3 The second war, called the Suez or Sinai War, broke out in October 1956. This was not an integral development of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict, but at the same time it was also not completely disconnected from the increasing tensions and hostile rhetoric toward Israel that was being expressed in the Arab world, which was constantly promising the devastation of the Zionist state. In fact the '56 War can be seen as an Israeli reaction to several developments that were not linked to the Palestinian conflict but which were viewed in Israel as a threat to the state's national security: the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet block (1955); the nationalization of the Suez Canal; the ongoing raids from behind Arab borders; the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea (1954); and especially Jordan, Egypt, and Syria joining together to form a joint military command. The '56 War ended with an additional military failure (Egyptian only, this time) and exacerbated wounds to the Arab pride. Ultimately the '56 War solidified Arab hostility toward Israel. J4 The decade between the end of the Suez crisis and the third Arab Israeli war (1957-1967) did not bring about any change in the Arab attitude toward Israel. This period was characterized by two main developments: the first issue was the increasing bitter struggle over the limited water resources in the region (the Arabs attempted to by-pass the water sources of the Jordan river and prevent Israel from receiving the water needed for its existence and development); the second development. was the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a symbolic recreation of a Palestinian national entity aimed at replacing the Zionist national state alter its destruction. 15 The third Arab-Israeli war, the Six-Day War ofJune 1967, broke out as a climax to the previous decade of increasing tensions and ended in a painful defeat to the Arabs which included Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Two factors differentiated the outcome of this war over previous ones. First, Israel captured, during this "blitzkrieg," Arab territories that were three times larger than its pre-war territories (Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights), all of which contained about one million 13Iraq, which has no mulual border wilh Israel but shared the Israeli eastern front with Jordan, empowered the Jordanian aUlhorities 10 negotiate the terms and conditions for the withdrawal of the Iraqi unils. " Shimoni, Political, pp. 334-335; 3-17-348. 15Shimoni, Political, pp. 368-369. 124 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 Arabs. Second, unlike the previous war in which France and England assisted Israel, the Israelis fought alone and could not be accused of cooperating with Western imperialist powers. These facts added a serious trauma to the already existing Arab frustration and hostility and led to the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the War of Attrition (1969-1970). . One of the less famous Middle Eastern wars, the War ofAttrition, took place along Egyptian-Israeli cease fire lines in Sinai and caused both Egypt and Israel heavy casualties (about 1,000 Israelis were killed, more than were killed in the Six-Day War, a"nd about 10,000 Egyptians were killed, a similar number to the Egyptian losses in the previous war). The War of Attrition came to an end in the summer of 1970 due to the massive mediation of the Nixon administration (the Second Roger's Plan), but it could not but add an additional layer of frustration and rage to the ArabIsraeli conflict. 16 Frustration and a desperate desire to break through the political stalemate in the region pushed the new Egyptian President, Muhammad Anwar ai-Sadat, to initiate the fifth Arab-Israeli war, the Yom Kippur War ofOctober 1973. This war started with an Egyptian-Syrian strategic surprise and a few tactical achievements, but ended eighteen days later with a clear Israeli military victory. However, the Israeli units were stopped by United Nations cease-fire resolutions (338 and 339) only 101 kilometers short of the Egyptian capital city of Cairo. At this point no significant Egyptian forces could have stopped them. On the Syrian front the Israelis stood only . about 35 kilometers away from Damascus. Furthermore, about one-half of the Egyptian fighting forces, those which belonged to the Third Field Army, were surrounded and under siege in the southern segment of the Suez Canal. This time, the Israeli military victory did not have the same exacerbating effect on the general Arab-Israeli conflict that it had in previous wars. Whereas the essential outcome in all other wars had been that the Israeli victories had deepened Arab resentment and hostility towards Israel, in the 1973 war a slight shift in power occurred, and the seemingly unqualified Israeli victory was mitigated by two qualifying factors. First, the strategic surprise and the tactical achievements by the Arab armies in the first few days of the war cast a shadow over the Israeli victory. Second, the Super Powers through the auspices of the United 16Shimoni, Political, pp. 336, 349-352; see also Shimon Shamir, "The Crystallization of the Fundamental Perception of the October Offensive," Egypt Under Sadat, the Search for a Nelli Orientation (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978), pp. 85-100 (in Hebrew). 1be Arab-Israeli Peace Process 125 Nations denied Israel the fruits of its victory-that is, the destruction of the Egyptian Third Field Army and the occupation of the city of Suez.17 Understanding the significance of these two factors, it was Sadat, the Egyptian President, who converted a military defeat into an enormous political triumph. The first steps of the war, and above all the Egyptian crossing, were described and praised as a brilliant achievement of military heroism which proved to the entire world the ability of the Arabs to plan and execute complex military operations. Thus, they shattered the legend of the undefeatable Israeli forces, and cleansed the Arab armed forces of the stains of previous failures and defeats, returning their national pride and self confidence. According to Sadat, the "October War" engendered the psychological breakthrough that enabled a change in the course of Middle Eastern History. The Development of a Peace Process The buds of the Arab-Israeli peace process started to appear a long time before the first official steps were taken. Small and in many ways apparently insignificant islands of acceptance, understanding, and good will surfaced in the ocean of Arab opposition and rejection. During the British Mandate and following the Faysal-Weizman Agreement of 1919, there were other Arab leaders who supported, or at least agreed to, the idea of an independent jewish state in Eretz Israel, or parts thereof. Among them were Ismail Sidqi, a former Egyptian Prime Minister; Husni Barazi, a former Syrian Prime Minister; a few leading members of the Nashashibi Palestinian Arab Opposition Party; leaders from within the Maronite Church in Lebanon; and above all Abdullah Ibn-Hussein, the Hashimite king of Transjordan and later jordan, who maintained during his ruling era (1921-1951) good contacts with the leadership of the jewish Yishuv and the Zionist movement. However, those exceptional Arab leaders did not have the needed impact to influence the evolution of events toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 1B The first significant development in this complex trek was marked by four Arab states signing armistice agreements with the State of Israel. Those four states-Egypt, jordan, Lebanon, and Syria-signed the agreement only about a year after they initiated the May 1948 invasion which had aimed at destroying the new jewish state. By the very act of signing 17Shimoni, Political, pp. 336-338, 352-35'1. 18Shimoni, Political, pp. 111-112, 228, 306-308, 343-345. 126 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 the armistice, those Arab states themselves took the first official step down the road to recognition of Israel. 19 The next and more signil1cant step took place between 1949 and 1952. At that stage negotiations took place in which three Arab leaders made contacts with Israeli ofHcials to discuss ways to develop the armistice agreements into more solid treaties. The Arab participants included Egypt under King Faruq, Jordan under King Abdullah, and Syria under President Husni Za'im, who had come to power at the end of March 1949 in a coup d'etat which overthrew the former Syrian leader Shukri al-Quatli. The Israeli government of David Ben-Gurion apparently did not react very enthusiastically to the overtures for peace, fearing that these leaders did not well represent their people. Finally, the secret negotiations did not bear fruit, as their initiators did not remain in power. The Syrian leader Za'im was ousted in another military revolution by Sami Hinawi in August 1949. In July 1951 King Abdullah was murdered in Jerusalem and King Faruq was ousted a year later by the group known as the "Free OfHcers," led by General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser.2o The next political era, in the process which started in July 1952 with the rise of Nasser to power, marked a negative change in the Arab approach toward Israel, despite a short period at its beginning of unsuccessful Israeli secret attempts to achieve an agreement with the new Egyptian regime. This negative change was mainly the outcome of Nasser's aspirations to become the leader of the Arab world, the Muslim world, and, if possible, the Third World as well. An anti-colonial and anti-Western attitude characterized Nasser's efforts to achieve his goals, and the young and fragile Middle Eastern peace phenomenon was consequently pushed into a long period of deep freeze. 21 An additional opportunity for: a peaceful change appeared in the summer of 1967, following the Six-Day War. At that point the Israeli government of Levi Eshkol expressed its readiness to withdraw from almost all of the newly occupied territories (Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank with the exception of Eastern Jerusalem , which was immediately annexed) in return for Arab recognition and a comprehensive peace. The Arab reaction, however, was one of rejection. 19Shimoni, Political, p. 33'1. 2!'This exciling cpisodc is discusscd in dClail in a book by hamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 21Shimoni, Political, PI'. 223-227, 30'1-305, 345-349. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 127 The summit meeting of the Arab League in Khartoum in September 1967 called for a "political solution" with Israel (while the extremists in the Arab world continued to call for Israel's liquidation), but the summit's resolution asserted the famous three "No's" which were drafted by Nasser: no peace with Israel, no negotiation with Israel, and no recognition of Israel. Many further mediation efforts were made in the post-1967 era. The better-remembered ones are: the United Nations' initiative headed by the Swedish special emissary, Gunnar Jarring, and the United States initiative by President Nixon's administration, named after Secretary ofState, William Rogers. Those efforts did not come to fruition, and the political standstill continued despite an encouraging change in the tone of Arab pronouncements in which calls for the destruction of Israel were gradually disappearing .22 However, a further wait seemed to be needed before an actual thaw could begin. One of the most significant developments, and at the same time a much less recognized one, was the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abd aI-Nasser in Cairo in the Fall of 1970 shortly after Golda Meir's government achieved the cease-fire agreement that ended the War of Attrition. According to the Egyptian constitution, the Vice President Muhammad Anwar aI-Sadat became the acting President and was approved in October of the same year as the new President. In February 1971, shortly after he had overcome the entire opposing political centers of power in Egypt, Sadat expressed, on two different occasions, a new initiative that aimed to break the Middle Eastern stalemate. This initiative later became known as Sadat's First Initiative of February 1971.23 The full meaning of the term" peace" as then suggested by Sadat was not clear, and it was certainly not yet congruent with the Israeli understanding of the same term, but there was no doubt that the beginning of 22Shimoni, Political, pp. 342-359. 2Yfhe first expression lOok place on February 4, 1971, in a speech at the Egyptian National Council in which Sadat offered 10 sign an interim agreement with Israel in Sinai. This suggested agreement was also explained in an interview with Newsweek magazine on February 27, 1971, as a suggestion for an Israeli withdrawal 10 behind the EI Arish Ra's Muhammad line in Sinai. Sadat added, if the Israelis were looking for a "true peace," the Egyptians were more than ready for it. The second expression was made in Sadat's reply to Gunnar Jarring on February 15, 1971, in which he alTered a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. About this episode, sec Shimon Shamir, "Sadat's Initiative of February 1971," Egypt Under Sadat, the Search for a NellI Orientation (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978), pp. 67-70 (in Hebrew). 128 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 a change in the Egyptian attitude had been felt. 24 Thereafter, the term "peace" entered the Egyptian political lexicon with a different understanding from the way it had been understood during the Nasser era. During Nasser's reign the term in use had been "peace" and "justice" (for the Palestinian refugees) which meant the destruction of Israel. After the Sadat initiative of February 1971, the term changed simply to "peace" without the connection to the term "justice," preconditioned, of course, with the fulfillment of all Arab demands.25 Nevertheless, the Sadat initiative soon lost its momentum, as he felt that the Israeli government, headed by Golda Meir, did not show sufficient interest in it and that the Nixon administration viewed his initiative with similar disinterest. Thus, Sadat decided to turn to the military option, meaning to prepare his military forces massively in order to be able to accomplish his political goals. This military option was fully used in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973.26 The outcomes of the Yom Kippur War, and especially the Arab military achievements of the war's first few days, together with the political "earthquake" in Israel which followed the war, gave Sadat the feeling of a psychological breakthrough, which he believed was so needed in order to develop the atmosphere of change that he had already expressed in his February 1971 initiative. Between October 1973 and November 1977, Sadat continued to push his new approach forward. At this four-year period he did not completely abandon the idea that the establishment of the State of Israel meant to the Arabs an act of injustice, which should be canceled some day. The Egyptian policy, however, accepted the understanding that a comprehensive military decision was not pOSSible. Sadat, therefore, called for the withdrawal of Israel to the pre-June 1967 borders and for the establishment of a Palestinian Arab Nation State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and in return he was ready to sign a non-belligerency agreement with Israel and "Shimon Shamir, "The Consolidation of the Fundamemal Perception of lhe OClOber Offensive," Egypt Under Sadat, pp. 94-95 (in Hebrew). 25Shamir, "Sadal's Initiative." p. 68. 26In an imerview with the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv, on March 21, 1975, the former Israeli Minister of Defense. Moshe Dayan. said that the Israeli rejeclion of Sadal's firsl iniliative was a mistake that caused the failure to achieve a panial agreemem with Egypl a· long lime before the Yom Kippur War. an agreememthal could have prevemed lhe oUlbreak of lhis war. About this episode see Shamir. "The Consolidalion," pp. 94-100. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 129 to recognize the very existence of the State of Israel (leaving the mission to cancel the injustice to later generations).27 The main diplomatic mediation efforts that were made during those four years were by the American administration and by Dr. Henry Kissinger in particular, using his shuttle diplomacy. As a result ofthose efforts: a first Egyptian-Israeli agreement was achieved in November 1973, which was aimed at strengthening the postwar cease fire; a peace conference convened in Geneva Switzerland at the end of December' 1973; however, this forum did not attain momentum and was never reconvened. An agreement for the disengagement of the military forces was achieved in January 1974 and executed between February and March 1974, and a similar isolated agreement was achieved in the Syrian front in May 1974. The crown of Kissinger's achievements of that period was the EgyptianIsraeli first interim agreement in Sinai, in September 1975. According to this last agreement a significant Israeli withdrawal was implemented, including a withdrawal from the oil fields ofAbu-Rhodeis on the east coast of the Suez Bay in the Red Sea. This agreement also included an EgyptianIsraeli confirmation of their mutual responSibility to avoid the use of the military and to solve conflicts in peaceful ways. In addition, Egypt recognized Israel's right to use the Suez Canal for shipping its lading (the canal had been reopened for international sailing in June 1975). There were no parallel advances in the Syrian-Israeli arena, and a series of secret contacts between Israeli officials and King Hussein of Jordan had not yet developed a similar momentum, nor were any mutual agreements reached despite the de facto status of peace that had prevailed along the Israeli-Jordanian border. Kissinger's vigorous efforts to reach an additional interim agreement in the Sinai front were not succes~ful, nor were the attempts to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Thus the Arab-Israeli peace process went into another period of stalemate.28 It was Sadat, again, who made the move that amazed the world in November 1977, with his second peace initiative, when he declared his readiness, if needed, to go to Jerusalem in order to achieve peace. The initiative, secretly pre-discussed with senior Israeli officials of the newly 27For a detailed analysis of the Eh'YI)tian altitude during this four year period see Shimon Shamir, "Eh'YIJt'S Position During the Four Years FollOWing the War," Egypt Under Sadat, pp. 198-220 (in Hebrew). 2·Shimoni, Political, pp. 352-354. 130 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No.1 elected government of MenacheJ;l Begin and supported by them, became the most important turning point of the Arab-Israeli peace process, after which a real move toward an Arab recognition of Israel alongside a mutually irreversible process of reconciliation had started. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the same month, created a psychological breakthrough and ended with a mutual agreement to negotiate a peace treaty.29 Many reasons created and supported the shift in Sadat's attitude which was behind his initiative of November 1977; these factors reflected the fundamental political, social, and economic processes which Egypt experienced during the 1970's. The more important of these processes were: the post Nasserist mood which preferred a constructive concentration on Egypt's internal problems (such as the annual population growth of about one million people at that time, and the impoverishment of Egypt) over an attitude of ideological enthusiasm; weariness of being the spearhead for the Pan-Arab struggle and its requirements in terms of casualties and other losses; a realistic assessment that Israel's military superiority coupled with American support, compared to the aging Egyptian military forces and weakening Soviet support, precluded the option of destroying the Jewish state for the foreseeable future; an understanding that the continuation of the conflict would have hurt the possibilities for free political and cultural development in Egypt; realization that the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz ]srael had grown and crystallized to a level that would not allow it to be devastated. All of this was mixed together with hidden Egyptian hopes that ]sraeli science and technology could, and should, serve the entire region. l~inally there was a sober understanding of the vital role of the West, the United States in particular, as the only world power which could do two things: force Israel to make concessions and significantly support Egypt's financial needs.3D ]n addition to the reasons mentioned above, there were immediate factors which also increased Sadat's feelings of a need for change, such as the political deadlock after the achievement of the interim agreement in Sinai; the election of a new right-wing government to rule in ]srael, in May 1977; and the fact that a new administration, with PresidentJimmy Carter, assumed office in the White House in January 1977. Sadat could have 29Shimoni, Political. 30For a detailed analysis of those EI,'Yptian developments defining the 1970's and of the ripening of Sadat's November 1977 initiative, sec Shimon Shamir, "The Preparations of the Perceptual Structure for Negotiating with Israel," and "The Peace Initiative of November 1977, and Its Meanings," EgyjJt Under Sadat, pp. 187-194,226-246 (in Hebrew). The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 131 recognized new winds that were blowing in Washington, which feared the oil power of the Arabs but, to say the least, disliked Begin and his government and resented the American Jewish community for its lack of support, and which was showing a new interest in the Palestine question .3t An exhaustive and uneasy phase of negotiations followed Sadat's visit to Jerusalem; however, these negotiations ended successfully with the signing of the Camp David accords on September 17, 1978. This followed an unprecedented occurrence, in which President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were secluded for twelve days at Camp David, Maryland, the vacation retreat for the American president. Those accords provided the "framework agreements for peace in the Middle East." The efforts made by Carter and Sadat to extend this agreement to include other Arab states failed, as Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as the Soviet Union, rejected, at the end of November 1978, Sadat's invitation to join a conference in Cairo directed toward a renewal of the Geneva Conference. Another period of stubborn negotiations took place and needed a supplementary intensive intermediation, prior to the signing on March 26, 1979, of the first peace treaty between Israel and the strongest and most important Arab state, Egypt. This treaty was ratified on April 25, 1979, and its implementation completed three years later.32 The three-year period between June 1982 and June 1985 witnessed a suspension of the peace process due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to which the name "Operation Peace for the Galilee" was given. Beyond the officially declared goal of this war, to militarily destroy the infrastructure of the PLO in southern Lebanon, there was a hidden agenda of the second government of Menachem Begin (reelected in 1981) to assist the Christian Maronite community of Lebanon, under the leadership of the Gemayel family, to assume power in Lebanon, and to mold a permanent alliance between Israel and its northern neighboring state and, if possible, to establish and sign a peace treaty between the two countries. In August 1982 Bashir Gcmayel, the military leader of the Maronite falange, was elected President of Lebanon, having been the only candidate. Three weeks later, and a week before assuming office, he was killed in an 3'About thc allilUdc of thc Cancr administration toward the Arab-Israeli connict as well as the pcacc proccss scc Slcvcn L. Spicgcl, "Cancr Pursuing'a Lasting Pcacc," (chapter 8), The Other Arab-Israeli COIl/lict: Makillg All/erica's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago and London: Thc Uni\'Crsity of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 315-380. 32Shimoni, Political, pp. 35'1-356. 132 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 explosion at his headquarters. Amin Gemayel, Bashir Gemayel's more moderate and older brother, was elected as the new president. Amin promised to continue his brother's policy and had dealt with the Israeli government on an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty, which should have enabled a withdrawal of the Israeli forces that occupied the southern half of Lebanon. The treaty was actually signed on May 17, 1983, but Amin Gemayel did not have sufficient influence to initiate an Israeli retreat. However the Israeli government executed a partial withdrawal in September 1983. Amin Gemayel canceled his country's peace treaty with Israel, ten months after signing it, under pressure from the Syrian regime and because of opposing internal Lebanese political elements. In September 1984, due to a (limited in time) return of the Labor party to power in Israel in a national unity coalition government together with the right-wing Likud Party. The government was headed (during its two-year first half) by Prime Minister Shimon Peres, whose government gave another push for a policy to evacuate the military from Lebanon. The deadlock in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations regarding further Israeli withdrawal in return for security agreements along the two countries' mutual border, along with internal political pressures, brought this new government to declare a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, but leaving an Israeli military presence in a strip between three and six miles wide as a buffer zone north of the Israeli border. That buffer zone is still in existence. There were no significant changes or developments in the other arenas of the Arab-Israeli conflict during these years, as the focus shifted toward the Lebanese one. There were two additional initiatives for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first one was made in September 1982 by President Ronald Reagan's administration and was named after him. It was rejected by almost all the parties concerned, including the radical Arab countries, Israel, and the PLO. Jordan, which is considered a moderate Arab state, adopted some of the initiative's ideas, but finally rejected the plan as well, in March 1984. Only a limited support was expressed in Egypt regarding this initiative. The second one was initiated by the Saudi Arabian King Fahd, in August 1981, and was approved at the summit meeting of the Arab leaders in Fez-Morocco, in September 1982. However, this initiative did not gain momentum either. The Egyptian-Israeli peace witnessed at this period a cooling trend, owing to the invasion of Lebanon. Husni Mubarak, the new Egyptian president who succeeded Sadat, following the latter's assassination in October 1981, returned his ambassador from Tel Aviv in September 1982. This Egyptian attitude was part of Mubarak's efforts to bring his country back The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 133 to the Arab world, after Egypt was ostracized following the peace treaty with Israel. Only four years later, in the fall of 1986, did Mubarak decide upon a warming trend toward Israel following its withdrawal from most of Lebanon, and owing to the beginning of a change in which the Arab world started to re-accept Egypt as a major element in the Arab world.33 One of the most important consequences of the Lebanese episode was a ripening awareness in Israel of the limits of military might as an effective tool for the accomplishment of political goals. This awareness would continue and even get stronger at the end of the 1980's with the outbreak and during the Intifada. The next significant development of the peace process started at the end of 1987, when on December 9 a series of violent disturbances and demonstrations, later known as the Intifada, erupted in the Israelioccupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This phenomenon inflamed the entire Palestinian Arab population in these territories and created an unprecedented new situation according to which not only a rare occurrence of Palestinian unity became a factual reality, but this phenomenon also penetrated into the consciousness of the Israeli Jewish population and influenced it by arousing an understanding that a new phase had begun in the evolution of the conflict. Unlike the previous stage of Palestinian terrorism, which lasted for almost a quarter of a century but was limited in effect and with which the Israelis had learned to coexist, and which had no significant political achievements (except for the worsening of the mutual hatred and mistrust), the Intifada was envisaged in Israel, especially among the circles of the elite, as an interminable development that created the need to shatter the previous conflict's political status quo. The Intifada lasted for almost six years and came to an end only with the signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993. This accord practically redrew the pre-June 1967 green line between Israel and the occupied territories and led to the realization by a large part of the Israeli public that there could be a life beyond the era of occupation. Nevertheless, the Intifada increased and exacerbated the recognition among the Israeli Jewish population concerning the limitation of military might in a struggle for national recognition. This understanding had its beginnings following the Yom Kippur War and was strengthened during the adventure in Lebanon and became even 33Shimoni, Political, pp. 87-89, 203-20'1, 338-390, 356-360. About the Rcagan Middle Eastcrn initiati\'C ofSeptcmber 1982, see Spiegel, "Postscripts, Rcagan the First Three Years," (chapter 10), tbe Otber Arab·lsraeli Conjlict, pp. 395-429. 134 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, NO.1 stronger during the Intifada. It tremendously affected the Israeli national pride and as a result its political flexibility. Shortly before the outbreak of the Intifada, a political agreement was reached in London between King Hussein ofJordan and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, (who was castling offices with Izhak Shamir for the second half of the national Unity government between 1986 and 1988). This agreement calIed for the opening ofdirect negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian. delegation, under the auspices of an international conference. This agreement, which was terminated by the Israeli Prime Minister, probably could have saved the six-year-Iong bitter Israeli-Palestinian struggle of the Intifada, just as a positive reply to Sadat's first initiative could have stopped the Yom Kippur War.34 The next important development which influenced the peace process started at the end of the 1980's and did not occur in the region itself. The dismantling of the Soviet Empire, and with it the end of the Cold War, made clear to Syrian president Hafez aI-Assad (who assumed the leadership of the Arabs Rejectionist Front after the achievement of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty) that his previous ambitious desire to reach what he called a strategic equilibration with the Jewish state was subsequently no longer feasible. This realization by Assad brought him to symbolicalIy join the United Nations-United States-led coalition in the Gulf crisis during the second half of 1990 and the first few months of 1991. This participation was a prelude to a shift in Syria's traditional attitude toward a more proAmerican approach and the beginning of a Syrian move towards the Egyptian precedent. The next step occurred with the Syrian participation in the Arab-Israeli peace conference which followed the Gulf crisis and which was held in Madrid, Spain. The main importance of the Madrid formula was not in its rhythm of progress, but in the fact that this formula, which included the intensive assistance of the Bush administration in terms of intermediation, brought under the same roof an Israeli delegation with three Arab delegations-a Syrian one, a Lebanese one, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian one-who were all compelIed to acclimate to these unprecedented dynamics. The last, but not the least, phase of the peace process started in June 1992, when the Israeli constituency initiated a political topic by bringing back the Labor Party (and its allies) to power, after a fifteen-year-Iong dominance of the Likud government (and its political allies). There was 3'Shimon Peres. tbe Neill Middle East: A Fralllework and Process Towards an Era of Peace (Bene Herak: Slimalsky Publishing, 1993), pp. 22, 57. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 135 nothing really significant on the national agenda in Israel that could have been described as a political rift between the main political blocks, except for the question regarding the occupied territories, or in other words, the future of the peace process. Ever since the split of the Revisionist Movement from the mainstream of the Zionist Movement in 1935, during the Seventeenth Zionist Congress, this movement differed from the labor perceptions in an uncompromising way concerning the ultimate borders of the Jewish state, and about the future of the Arab inhabitants of those territories. The Labor Party, although desiring to keep an Israeli sovereignty upon the whole of Eretz Israel, nevertheless made a choice (within the framework of real politics) to engrave on its flag the idea of a territorial compromise, and it went with this slogan to the competition with the constituency's support during the election campaign of 1992. The verdict of the people of Israel called for a change in the state's political attitude, and this was the way the new leadership of Itzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres proceeded. About six months following the establishment of the new government, at the beginning of 1993, a channel for negotiating with the leadership of the PLO in Tunis, Tunisia, was opened by two Israeli professors of Middle Eastern History, in Oslo, Norway. This channel was approved and adopted by the Israeli leadership to secretly negotiate with the leadership of the PLO for an agreement that would end the Zionist-Palestinian dispute, which always was the nuclcus of the Arab-Isracli conflict. The Oslo channel servcd for eight months and 'cnded its rolc with the signing, on Septcmber 13, 1993, of the Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Declaration of Principle, on the White House lawn in Washington, DC, only a few days short of thc eve of a new Jewish year, 5754 (1993-1994). This agreement brought about a mutual recognition betwecn the two parties and marked the first steps toward thc implemcntation of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho first, and latcr Palestinian self-rule in greater areas of the occupied territories. This Israeli-Palestinian agreement paved the way for the pOSSibility of an ultimate scttlcment of the Arab-Israeli conflict that started ovcr a century ago. The implications of this were already felt during the last Jewish year which ended at the beginning of September 1994. Some characteristic elements of progress included the agreements toward peace between Israel and Jordan; further agreements with the PLO concerning the Palestinian self-rule; the establishment of diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel; further steps toward an agreement with Syria; a weakening of the Arab boycott against Israel; an additional warming trend 136 Sf/OFAR Fall.1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 in the Egyptian-Israeli arena; and improvement of the Israeli position in Europe and especially in the third world; and many other areas. Further dramatic developments have already occurred in the peace process during the first three months of the new Jewish year 5755, of which the most important was the signing of the second peace treaty, between Israel and the Hashimite Kingdom ofJordan in October 1994. Conclusions Nearly twelve decades of Arab enmity toward the Zionist enterprise in Eretz Israel seems to be gradually but clearly fading at the setting of the twentieth century. The Arab-Israeli peace process, which had hesitantly begun to appear deep in the previous era of Arab rejection and antagonisms, has demonstrated in the last two years an uncompromising approach aiming to end the Arab-Israeli conflict before the turn of the this century. Many reasons and developments supported the creation and progress that were needed in order to reach the present phase. Nonetheless there were three elements in particular that supplied this process with the needed persistc~"lt determinedness. The first element was found in the personality and character of Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, who, almost a quarter of a century ago, ventured to create the needed psychological breakthrough that enabled a change to occur in the course of the conflict. When Sadat assumed office he already understood the fundamental verities: first that there existed no prospects for him to succeed where Nasser, the preceding Egyptian charismatic president had failed, i.e., to destroy the existence of theJewish state; second, that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute never was, and never should have been, considered the main national prohlem of Egypt, for which the increase of population and its economic implication were far more important. Consequently Sadat realized that only the United States had the financial ahility and political will to rescue the deteriorating Egyptian economy. Once Sadat had made a decision to change, he executed it in his uniquely determined style, just as he did in 1970 when he decided to eliminate the previous Nasserist centers of political power. He decided in 1971 and acted on his decision with his first peace initiative; in 1972 he decided to expel the Soviets from Egypt; in 1972-1973 he decided to prepare for the inevitable war; and in 1977 he decided to initiate his second peace initiative. Sadat paid the suhlime price for the changes that he made and acted upon, as did King Abdullah of Jordan three decades The Arab-Israeli Peace Process 137 earlier. However, there was no power that could have shifted the conflict thereafter from its new direction. The second element was the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequently the settling of the Cold War. This development, at the end of the 1980's, tore loose the foundations for continuing conflict, in which the Middle Eastern clients served the conflicting interests of their patron powers, sometimes even beyond their regional conflict, and in which radical local leaders could always find financial, political, and military support of their uncompromising attitudes. The third element was the shift of the basic perception of the Israeli constituency, due to the moral, ethical, and practical lessons learned from the endless process of hatred and violence, but especially from the lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the war in Lebanon, and the Intifada. Given the opportunity, the new Israeli leadership of Rabin and Peres made great efforts to change the dynamics of the peace process in a way that seems to be no less dramatic and successful than the one made by Sadat. The last developments of the peace process appear to be leading the Zionist movement beyond its third historical turning point and into a new era of unprecedented challenge and creativity, maintaining and fostering a new era ofJewish national life in a tolerant and peaceful Middle East. ...

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