Der Gelbe Fluss in Shandong (1851-1911): Uberschwemmungskatastrophen und ihre Bewaltigung im China der spaten Qing-Zeit (review)

In 1851 the Yellow River broke its dikes at Fengbei in North Jiangsu and again in 1855 at Tongwaxiang. Repairs were delayed because of the financial and organizational weakness of the Qing dynasty at that time. Finally the Court decided that for the time being the Yellow River should not be forced back into its old southeastern course. The damage had been enormous, in terms of lost human lives, farmland, and housing. However, after the initial inundations along the lower reaches in Henan and Shandong, the river found a more or less stable ten- to forty-kilometer-wide flood channel to the sea along the Qinghe River, and formed a giant flood-catchment area downstream of Heze. As its regime stabilized, the governors of Jiangsu and the Jiangnan gentry did not favor a return of the Yellow River into the old channel, because it would bring floods back to Jiangsu and cause the loss of the profitable overseas grain transport (which had saved the Court money as well). In 1871 the Yellow River took a southern direction again. Repairs were made by Ding Baozhen, but the strengthened dikes were designated as local dikes (that is, neither official nor civilian), to be cared for by local magistrates, so as to avoid the appearance of a permanent choice being made for a new northward course. Only in 1885, after the Sino-French war had shown the vulnerability of sea transport, did the Court reconsider the possibility of restoring tribute-grain transport via the Grand Canal.

By measuring the effects of the floods based on tax-relief records, Amelung concludes that Henan was more severely affected than Shandong. Even so, the total economic damage to Shandong surpassed half a century of its tax returns, and many farmers migrated to the Northeast. Dike repairs in Henan were completed in 1875, but these created new siltation problems in downstream Shandong. The controversies at the Court over these issues lasted a dozen years. You Baichuan was entrusted with the investigation of the matter, and he insisted that the Yellow River be divided into two courses, which was technically impossible. The author suspects that You's main concern was the protection of his home district Binzhou. In any case, local protectionism hampered integral planning and decision making. Too many heavy dikes were built, with little effect. Many had been built primarily to protect local people and property. It was only Zhang Yao who came up with the partial solution of moving some of the population nearest to the river out of the area. After the 1898 floods, Li Hongzhang had a thorough survey made, which resulted in a more comprehensive plan. A partial, cheaper version of this was implemented by Governor Zhou Fu. At the end of the Qing period, about five thousand military and civil-service personnel were working in a new Yellow River control organization set up by the province independently from the previous Yellow River Canal organization.

Several observations on constraints on Yellow River control emerge from Amelung's account. First, dike construction suffered from the low quality of the soil, and, because of the shifting nature of the river bed, high dikes had to be constructed in different places time and again. Bricks and stones came into use for this purpose only at the end of the Qing dynasty, and dikes did not have a vegetative cover. Regular maintenance of these bare, sandy dikes was defective or even absent altogether. In principle, this should have been done through a combination of government-paid overseers and local labor, using reeds and other locally stored materials for dike repairs. However, in many devastated, poor, and bandit-infested areas along the river it was not possible to generate the necessary organization, funds, and labor, and government officials hesitated to move in. As...