Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (review)

144 SHOFAR Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords, by Shibley Telhami. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 203 pp. $40.00. This study by Shibley Telhami, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Cornell University, is a sophisticated and competent work on the path to the Camp David Accords within the framework of a sometimes almost impenetrable thicket of theoretical concepts and constructs. Before getting into the subject matter that presumably most readers will be interested in, namely the Camp David negotiations and peace process, the author labors hard to establish his credentials and proficiency with the methodology and typologies of theories and concepts (descriptive, positive, prescriptive, and abstractive theories, collinearity, cross-level fallacies, and the "nesting procedure"). Political scientists who have their preponderant focus on methodology and empirical theory will likely be impressed. The book includes a wide range of cited source material and references, including interviews with important Egyptian, Israeli, and American negotiators and commentators. The documentary Appendix includes valuable material on opening bargaining positions at Camp David compared with final results, and the final Accords, memoranda, and letters. Telhami advances two unconventional arguments concerning the Camp David Accords. He maintains that Egypt's decision for a bilateral peace agreement with Israel even at the expense of relations with the rest of the Arab world resulted from major changes in the distribution of military and economic power globally and regionally and not from Egyptian leadership change and internal economic crises. His second argument is that many of the specific terms of the agreement were a function of leadership and systems of government, and that centralized systems ("strong states") are less conducive to optimal bargaining than decentralized governments ("weak states"). The conclusion about governmental systems and leadership relates in Egypt's case to a centralized system where Sadat was the decision-maker, which unfavorably reflected itself in the Camp David negotiations. The situation for Israel involved a pluralistic system of party politics and coalition cabinets where even a strong prime minister who by his personal make-up was not inclined to tolerate dissent felt the need to consult his Camp David negotiating team as actual partners, and benefited from the process. Telhami's comparative analysis of leaders' personalities and bargaining behavior as applied to Begin, Carter, and Sadat is particularly interesting. It can be argued, however, that he weighs in more negatively toward Carter and more favorably toward Begin than may be justified. How, indeed, could any agreements have been reached and the conference even held together for thirteen days without the central role of Carter? Volume 10, No.1 Fall1991 145 The author argues that Sadat was excessively inclined toward wishful thinking, often failed to distinguish between personal (social) and state (professional) relations, and was too uninterested and even lazy to deal with detail; high-ranking Egyptian diplomatic figures are quoteq on these last points. One of them, an Egyptian foreign minister Butrus Ghali, expressed matters succinctly to Telhami: "Sadat was a real amateur. He often moved hastily and unpredictably." An important conclusion by the author is that Israel 's bargaining behavior at Camp David more closely corresponded to optimal bargaining than did that of Egypt or the United States. Butrus Ghali, however, concluded that even if there had been a different given optimal Egyptian bargaining behavior the results could not have been substantially different because "'objectively speaking, our relative weakness was out there for the whole world to see.'" While Telhami belabors his methodology and bargaining systems typologies , he has brought forth a well integrated and intellectually sophisticated study that is a worthwhile contribution to the methodological and subject matter fields involved. Scott D. Johnston Department of Political Science Hamline University The American Search for Mideast Peace, by Dan Tschirgi. New York: Praeger, 1989. 294 pp. $49.95. The attempt to make peace between Israel and the Arabs has been a I major feature of international diplomacy for decades and a primary interest of the United States since 1967. During the period since the Six Day War the U.S. has taken the lead in attempting to formulate various plans for resolving the conflict. When Israel and Egypt were finally...