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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED Dr. Marion E. Marts University of Washington Over the past several years I have been an ardent proponent of joint and coordinated international development of the Columbia River, which I have long viewed as one of the most important opportunities available in the field of international water resource cooperation. In an article in Water Power in February, 1961, I argued that the international agreement just reached, which became a treaty while the article was in press, was a long step forward toward international cooperation on the Columbia but there were many uncertainties yet to be resolved, some of them extremely important. The underlying intent of the agreement, and of the treaty, was impeccable: that both countries would share equitably in an efficient, joint development, The Columbia River Treaty, signed on January 17, 1961 by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, was ratified immediately by the United States Senate. A year and a half later, the Treaty, not yet ratified by the Canadian Parliament, is the occasion of a lively controversy between the federal government in Ottawa and the province of British Columbia. The question has not been, however, whether the Treaty is good or not, but whether it should be approved on Ottawa's or Victoria's terms. The general feeling has been that it would be unfortunate and embarrassing if the Treaty were to be a casualty of internal bickering in Canada over questions of financing and of export or non-export of Canada's share of the power. There is in Canada, however, a small but vocal minority opposed to the Treaty on the grounds that it sacrifices Canadian interests to those in the United States; that United States negotiators somehow "put one over" on Canada. These people argue that the Treaty is not a good one and should not be ratified on anybody's terms. Let us review their arguments, and then go on to suggest that they have reached the right conclusion but for the wrong reasons. This Canadian minority opposition makes several points: 1.The Treaty calls for Canada to give up entirely, or at least severely restrict, its right to develop the full all-Canadian power potential of the Kootenay-Columbia-Fraser diversion-and-development scheme, generally referred to as the McNaughton Plan. 2.The Treaty emasculates the full potential of the Mica Creek damsite in two ways: (a) by location downstream from Mica of the other two reservoirs which Canada would construct, and (b) by approving United States construction of Libby Dam on the Kootenay River in Montana, thus depriving the Mica site of the benefit of diversion of the Kootenay River into the headwaters of the Columbia in interior British Columbia. 3.The Treaty undermines the right of the upstream state, in this case Canada, to assert riparian sovereignty over its waters outside and beyond the terms of the Treaty. 4.The United States would enjoy the better financial bargain stemming from implementation of the Treaty. 36 The depth of this Canadian minority's feeling is best illustrated by a statement of Larratt Higgins in the autumn, 1961, issue of the International Journal (XVI:4, p. 404), as follows: "The inescapable conclusion of a critical analysis of the Columbia River Treaty is that it represents an outstanding triumph for the United States, and a crushing, if not humiliating defeat for Canada." This is strong language, and raises several questions: To what extent is this Canadian position well-taken? Does the Treatv indeed provide for equitable sharing of benefits and costs? If not, to what extent may the United States be taking advantage of a friendly but less powerful neighbor? Are the advantages to the United States as overwhelming as Mr. Higgins implies? These are complex questions but it is possible to make some assertions which are plausible enough to warrant expert attention, and' we have the right to challenge the experts on both sides of the border to provide answers. Let us examine the points made by Canadian critics. McNaughton Plan Under the Treaty, Canada would be obliged to forego any Columbia-toFraser river diversion and most, if not all, of a Kootenay-to-Columbia diversion. Passing...

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