Water Resource Policy Implications of the Hells Canyon Controversy

WATER RESOURCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE HELLS CANYON CONTROVERSY Marion E. Marts, University of Washington The implications of power policy are of paramount concern to the Pacific Northwest because of the magnitude and importance of the hydroelectric resources, both developed and potential, in that region. In May, 1953, Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay issued a statement, dealing with the Hells Canyon controversy, which may turn out to be the most significant power policy decision since the federal government undertook development of the Tennessee Valley program and Grand Coulee Dam, The potential policy implications of the statement are of primary importance both to the Pacific Northwest and to water resource programs in general, and warrant careful examination. Before examining some of the basic implications, it will be well to review briefly the issue on which Mr. McKay had to make a decision. Statement of the Case The Hells Canyon issue is complicated from all standpoints: political , economic, hydrologie, and engineering. Those, and there are many, who see it in simple black-and-white terms are indeed fortunate. Many arguments, and myriads of figures, have been advanced both pro and con. Much of the argument has been irresponsible, and much of it is not pertinent. Stated simply, the question is this: should the Hells Canyon reach of the Snake River be used for one of the six large reservoirs recommended as part of the comprehensive federal plan for development of the Columbia River, or should the same reach of the river be used by the Idaho Power Company for a smaller development which will meet the needs of the company 's market area in Southern Idaho. The rather general assumption that the issue is a controversy between public and private power is an oversimplification which ignores the difference in the size and objectives of the alternative proposals. In a broad sense, the conflict is between a project serving regional needs and one serving the needs of a section of the region; in other words it poses the issue of regions'! vs. local development. The federally-proposed Hells Canyon project would be a high dam, as large as Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, with a reservoir having a usable storage capacity of 3,880, 000 acre-feet, three-fourths as much as Grand Coulee. The power plant would have an initial installed capacity of 800,000 and ultimately 900,000 kilowatts. Water released from the reservoir for power production would be used at this plant and at eight downstream run-of-river power plants if the comprehensive plan is executed, for a total continuously available power contribution of over 1,000,000 kilowatts, nearly half that of the gigantic Grand Coulee project. At present, one of the downstream plants is completed (Bonneville) and two are under construction (McNary and The Dalles). Four, not yet started, would be on the Lower Snake, and the eighth, John Day, would be on the Columbia main stem. All of these run-of-river plants depend on upstream storage for winter water releases. The Hells Canyon reservoir would serve an important but modest flood control function; however, power is by far the major purpose. This means that nearly all the costs of the project would be repaid, inasmuch as power is a reimbursable function. Any surplus power revenues would be used to help defray the irrigation costs of the proposed Mountain Home Project, but there is no physical connection between the Hells Canyon proposal and irrigation. 1953of Pacific Coast Geographers33 The main purpose of the Hells Canyon proposal, thus, would be to store water which would be used for power production at the site and at the run-of-river plants downstream during the winter low-flow period. At present, three of the six planned reservoirs have been completed, Grand Coulee, Hungry Horse, and Albeni Falls, providing not quite half of the 20,000,000 acre-feet of storage capacity considered necessary by the federal agencies concerned. With the six reservoirs and the planned downstream plants, approximately thirty per cent, 10, 000, 000 kilowatts, of the Columbia's power potential would be realized. This would quadruple the present prime power capacity of the Federal Columbia River...