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Technology and Culture 44.3 (2003) 613-614



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On the Fast Track: French Railway Modernization and the Origins of the TGV, 1944-1983. By Jacob Meunier. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. Pp. xxi+255. $62.

Europe's first high-speed rail system—an unparalleled success story. Such is the general view of the French train à grande vitesse (TGV). Jacob Meunier wants to challenge this view. He claims that the TGV was "until the time of its birth, an unwanted child" (p. 2). The first TGV system, running from Paris to Lyon, was developed from 1965 to 1983, but Meunier begins his story earlier, at the end of World War II. In the first chapter, he portrays the TGV in the context of efforts at modernization by the French national railways (SNCF).

The following three chapters are dedicated to three factors that induced [End Page 613] the SNCF to introduce a high-speed research program. First, competition by road and air became a severe threat to its economic and organizational foundations; in consequence, unprofitable lines were closed and the SNCF went through a restructuring process that brought faster and more luxurious services to main lines. Second, by the mid-1960s the Japanese Shinkansen came into operation with sweeping success; this record-breaking train shocked railway companies all over Europe, and one French historian calls this phenomenon the "Tokaido complex." Third, the Aérotrain, an air-cushion vehicle invented by Jean Bertin, also showed the way toward an ultrafast intercity network. Bertin found an influential supporter for his ambitious plans in the French authority for regional development, the DATAR.

The concept of a French high-speed train running on new dedicated track was developed in the newly designed research department of the SNCF, and by the end of the 1960s plans had been elaborated that involved a project team of engineers and economists. Despite opposition, mainly by the DATAR and regional pressure groups, the TGV project made its way into the sixth economic plan. The final decisions on equipment and construction had to be made by 1973. Though a skeptical opposition had formed in the highest political circles, the project passed through the interministerial council as a result of tricky strategies, an exceptional international situation (the Mideast oil crisis), and the strong support by Prime Minister Messmer and President Pompidou.

Even after Pompidou signed the decrees (three days before his death), opposition to the high-speed train did not cease. Giscard d'Estaing, Pompidou's successor, was a harsh opponent of TGV, and regional pressure groups made the construction difficult throughout the latter 1970s. Yet to German observers, opposition appeared rather weak, as Thomas Zeller notes in Straße, Bahn, Panorama (2002). The success story in Meunier's account really starts with the introduction of the TGV and yet another change in the political context: President Mitterand strongly supported the construction of more lines all over France.

Although Meunier stresses difficulties in introducing the TGV, it is certainly worth noting that the British high-speed rail project failed altogether and the German ICE took ten years longer to be realized. Hence the enumeration of difficulties seems exaggerated. Nevertheless, Meunier's is a very well-researched and brilliantly written historical account. While several authors have published good studies on the TGV for French readers, his is the first aimed at an English-speaking audience. It can be highly recommended to anyone interested in railway history, large technological systems, or French history of technology.

 



Stefan Zeilinger

Dr. Zeilinger is a historian of technology whose research interests include the comparative history of high-speed rail in postwar Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden.

Permission to reprint a review published here may be obtained only from the reviewer.

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