Abstract

The paper argues that care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as an important virtue. Doing so allows us to achieve two desirable goals. First, we preserve what is important about care ethics (for example, its insistence on particularity, partiality, emotional engagement, and the importance of care to our moral lives). Second, we avoid two important objections to care ethics, namely, that it neglects justice, and that it contains no mechanism by which care can be regulated so as not to be become morally corrupt.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-2001
Print ISSN
0887-5367
Pages
pp. 161-192
Launched on MUSE
2003-08-26
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2009
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