Making China Policy: From Nixon to G. W. Bush, and: Secrecy in U.S. Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China (review)

The two books under review testify to the long-established idea that bureaucratic politics matters in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Although both books are by political scientists and focus on U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), they adopt different research strategies and can be described as studies of bureaucratic politics only because they dwell on how the policymaking process shaped U.S. ties with the PRC.

Jean Garrison intends to “explore and refine a theory of strategic framing in the context of foreign policy advisory systems” by examining change and continuity in America’s China policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. The focus on “strategic framing,” she argues, requires paying attention to “the structure of the advisory process, the nature of presidential involvement, and the interaction patterns among central advisers” (pp. 203–204). Garrison thus frames her analysis around such issues as the struggle over the definition of the challenges posed by China among top U.S. foreign policymakers, the formulation of polices to meet such challenges within the national security advisory system, the communication of such policies to the president (who has the final say), and the effort to gain support for these policies from the Congress and the public.

Six chapters constitute the main body of Garrison’s book, with each chapter devoted to one president from Nixon to George W. Bush (Gerald Ford is discussed together with Nixon). Each chapter evolves around the “strategic framing” of U.S. policy toward China. For the Nixon administration, the task was how to reframe U.S.-China relations in geostrategic terms, connect the China policy to a new structure for world peace, and prepare the domestic ground for policy change. For the Carter administration, the central concern was how to push forward normalization while managing U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Taiwan relations. Under Ronald Reagan, the key issue unfolded around the contest between a “China-first” strategy and a “Taiwan-first” approach. For George H. W. Bush, the challenge was how to maintain a meaningful dialogue with the PRC and how to manage the public uproar in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. For Bill Clinton’s administration, the policy question was how to develop a strategy of engagement that would encourage economic liberalization and progress toward democratization in China. For George W. Bush, the problem was how to continue engaging a rising China for its cooperation in areas of common interest without damaging other U.S. vital interests, such as the commitment to Taiwan. Garrison also wonders whether the “war on terror” provided a more lasting foundation for U.S.-China cooperation.

Garrison concludes that the advisory systems in these administrations were crucial to understanding why policy choices evolved as they did. The centralized Nixon and George H. W. Bush systems, for example, ensured the consistency and predictability of policy toward China but risked excluding dissenting voices. In contrast, the more decentralized advisory systems under Jimmy Carter, Reagan, and Clinton gave rise to bureaucratic infighting, which caused vacillation and fragmentation of policy. The cognitive predispositions of the presidents also shaped choices. Reagan and George W. Bush tended to see the world through an ideological lens, whereas others proved to be more flexible in their outlooks.

Unlike Garrison, Yukinori Komine focuses exclusively on the Nixon administration’s policy toward China. The extreme secrecy surrounding the policymaking process affected the bureaucratic interplay. Nixon and Kissinger, Komine points out, believed that secrecy was crucial to prevent leaks, to forestall possible opposition from the right, and to avert bureaucratic pressure for concessions. As a result, secret diplomacy greatly shaped the U.S. rapprochement with China.

Komine begins with a discussion of...