Ruining the Neighborhood: War with Iraq and the Neighbors

As can be expected of many initiatives in the Middle East, the war in Iraq did not turn out as anyone expected. No one doubted that the United States would win the war, however victory is defined, but neither the run-up to the war, its conduct, or its aftermath has turned out as anyone had predicted.

While this might not be surprising, it is remarkable, because each and every group of pundits had different predictions, and they all were wrong. Who expected that French president Jacques Chirac would, out of the blue, undermine U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and give the hawks a golden opportunity to bypass the United Nations Security Council? Few Americans expected that Turkey would rebuff a U.S. request to use its territory to attack Iraq, and especially that it would reject an appeal delivered by Ankara's best friend in Washington, Paul Wolfowitz. Initial Iraqi resistance surprised those who had predicted a cakewalk through capitulating Iraqi forces and almost desynchronized the pace of the invasion. That the rebellious Shiite south was the site of the most effective Iraqi defense in the war surprised everyone. Then to everyone's further surprise, Iraqi forces collapsed suddenly and completely once American units entered Baghdad. The collapse followed the surprisingly good account the Iraqis gave of themselves at the beginning. The collapse cannot be explained simply by what appears to be one more example of Saddam Hussein's inept micromanagement. The superb U.S. armed forces, fortunately, rescued Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from the consequences of his own inept micromanagement. A superb military machine, however, has proven inadequate to the task of making up for the politicians' lack of preparation, planning, and resources to manage the war's aftermath, a problem complicated by the Defense Department's efforts to exploit the war in order to occupy the State Department.

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As these words are being written, in spring 2003, those in Washington who were most eager for war are beginning to backtrack from their claim that the road to Middle East peace lies through Baghdad. They had argued that the defeat of Saddam and the establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq would be key to solving the Palestinian problem. A superhawk proponent of this line of thought, Richard Perle, surprised many by noting in mid-April that democracy in Iraq might well lead to a theocratic regime, by inference unfriendly to American and Israeli interests.

Others, who had written extensive op-ed pieces arguing that the defeat of Iraq would teach Saudi Arabia a lesson, reduce our dependence on Saudi oil, and lower oil prices worldwide, have muted their opinions. Some had even argued that defeating Iraq and opening its hydrocarbon resources to American exploitation would reduce Russia to its proper, inferior role in the world. Recent events at the UN and the reluctance of U.S. and British oil companies to tread into a situation that is legally murky, at the very least, have seriously dampened these expectations.

Many expected an amazingly extensive list of positive consequences for the United States and negative consequences for its enemies to flow from the military defeat of Saddam. Granted, those making the arguments knew that much of this rhetorical hype was aimed at convincing the American people to support a preemptive attack. They did not seem to have carefully considered what effect these arguments would have among listeners outside the United States. The divisions in the Western world have not yet healed.

On the other hand, those predicting an explosion on the Arab street, bringing down pro-American governments from Morocco to Oman, also have been disappointed. Generally, the protests failed, not only because of government repression but also because the street knew that Saddam was a truly evil man. The idea of bringing down your own government to save this monster did not inspire revolution. Increasingly, however, the Arab street, as well...