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236 LANGUAGE, VOLUME 68, NUMBER 1 (1992) ker-Rhodes but ranging widely in reference and allusion. It solves no problems but addresses the complexity of the situation in a stimulating way. [Ronald K. S. Macaulay, Pitzer College .] Thought and language. By J. M. Moravcsik. (The problems of philosophy : Their past and present.) London & New York: Routledge, 1990. Pp. ix, 283. This title is reminiscent of others, e.g. John Pollock's Thought and language. Lev Vygotsky 's Thought and language, Kent Bach's Thought and reference, John Carroll's Language and thought, Benjamin Lee Whorfs Language, thought, and reality, Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny's Language and reality, and Noam Chomsky's Language and mind. But the current work does not stack up to any of these others. The book contains two parts, 'Problems' and 'Proposals', each consisting of three chapters: 'Ontology' (3-45, 129-166), Thought' (46-91, 167-214), and 'Language' (92-126, 215-264). This makes for a lot of territory to be covered, which Mjustifies by saying that we need to look at the forest as well as the trees (vii). In the chapters on ontology M defends realism with respect to possibility and necessity, universals, and the existence ofboth objects and events as primary ontological categories, and he discusses conditions on individuation and the persistence of individuals. M's defense will win few converts, since much of it boils down to his feeling that his position is 'natural to assume' (20). The chapters on thought make a variety of main points. First, behaviorism, functionalism, and eliminativism are all inadequate; M maintains that mental contents are Platonistic objects . Second, the mind-body problem is separate from semantic issues (51). Note that, if this is true, M's survey sprawls over two distinct forests. Third, M distinguishes between 'peripheral' common sense and 'basic' common sense: the one is culture-specific, while the other is 'that set of concepts and principles which we find indispensable... It includes, for example, the belief that there are causal links between some parts of nature' (168). But M's claim that science never contradicts basic common sense is vacuous if nothing truly qualifies as basic common sense. The premise that parts of nature are causally linked, for instance, is dispensable within Leibniz's theory of windowless monads. The chapters on language present M's 'Lexical Theory of Meaning'. He begins with a proposal that is hardly discernible from the theory of sense: The meaning of a word "w" is that in virtue of which an element in reality counts as a h'' (219). But later he seems to contradict himself, arguing that meanings do not determine reference (253). This inconsistency, real or apparent , is never explained. M schematizes lexical meaning in terms of four 'explanatory factors'. The 'm[aterial]-factor ' specifies whether a denotatum is abstract or material, an event or a state, a percept, or other. The 'f-factor' specifies the function of a denotatum, where one exists. The 's[tructure]factor ' individuates meanings via contrast-sets. Finally, the 'a[gency]-factor' is important for terms for artifacts and animals. Thus, the mfactor of chair is being material, the f-factor is the use for sitting, the s-factor distinguishes chairs from benches, pews, etc., and the a-factor is being an artifact (as opposed to seat, which has no a-factor). Although M's theory resembles that ofJerrold Katz, M does not explain how his theory differs from Markerese or how it escapes the pitfalls of Markerese (in fact, M does not even cite Katz). Furthermore, M's formulation confuses use and mention. In saying that the m-factor of chair is being material, M says that the word chair is (or contains) something material. What M should say is that the denotation of chair is material, or perhaps that the m-factor of chair is 'being material'. This kind of imprecision— which is easy to indulge in if you assume essentialism , as M does—characterizes the book as a whole. M's attempt to provide a view of the big picture is admirable, and he raises some interesting issues, e.g. the roles of explanation and normativity in meaning. However, I cannot...

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