Norm Entrepreneur or Interest Maximiser?: China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2001–2010

In December 2010, over 2,000 Chinese military and police personnel partici-pated in 10 different United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, making China the top contributor among the five permanent members of the Security Council, and 15th overall. Compared to the total of 120 personnel that contributed in January 2003, the current figure represents more than a 16-fold increase over an eight-year period — a remarkable growth by any standards. The change in China’s attitude is even more remarkable, considering its adamant objections to the concept of peacekeeping after joining the United Nations in 1971. Initially, China viewed all peacekeeping attempts as pretexts for the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, to intervene in the domestic affairs of small countries. Many analysts believe this suspicion is deeply rooted in China’s memory of the 150 years of invasion and humiliation by Western colonial powers and more recently, by direct clashes with the UN forces during the Korean War in 1951. The statement made by Huang Hua, China’s then ambassador to the UN during the Security Council discussion of the deployment of UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in 1973, appositely summarised this attitude:

China has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called ‘peacekeeping forces’. We maintain the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. Such a practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control with the superpowers as the ‘behind-scenes-boss’. ¹

Consequently, China refused to participate in Security Council voting on peacekeeping operations, pay its annual assessed peacekeeping dues, or send troops on peacekeeping missions. However, even during the time of total opposition, China maintained a careful balance between the expressed foreign policy principle and practical considerations. Despite its objections to peacekeeping operations, China did not exercise its veto power in the Security Council when peacekeeping missions were debated and discussed.

China gradually evolved from outright opposition and non-participation to limited support and involvement.² It voted in 1981 to support Security Council Resolution 495, authorising the extension of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). A year later, it began paying UN peacekeeping dues. In 1990, China sent observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) to officially participate, but remained relatively inactive in UNPKOs until only a few years ago.

China’s participation, or non-participation, in UNPKOs involves more than a simple decision about resource allocation. It reflects a political statement of the Chinese position on the multilateral security regime and its attitude towards the other great powers. The decision is the result of careful assessment and evaluation of its foreign policy stances and political and diplomatic environments. Hence, the dramatic increase in China’s interest in and commitment to UNPKOs in the new millennium could provide an opportunity to examine its overall policy concerns and directions, along with other contributing factors that may have played a role in its decision-making processes.

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Analysts have suggested various reasons for China’s growing interest in UNPKOs. The first set of explanations loosely follows a realist perspective with an emphasis on national geopolitical interests. Discussions about Chinese interest in securing natural resources,³ reaffirming the “one China” principle regarding the Taiwan issue,⁴ or expanding its sphere of influence,⁵ fall into this category. In many cases, the connections are ad hoc; different peacekeeping missions are presumed to serve different areas of interest. Beyond immediate national interests, some analysts suggest that the shift in China’s attitude may also reflect its grand strategy of using multilateralism to counterbalance US actions. China’s active participation in UNPKOs indicates support for the multilateral approach to conflict resolution. Making the UN, more specifically the Security Council, an integral part of the global security regime will ensure that China’s voice will be heard and its interests respected.

The second perspective views Chinese participation as the result of a gradual, practical adaptation to the new norms of the peacekeeping regime.⁶ As international security regimes and...