Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman The capitulation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on June 9, 1999, after seventy-eight days of bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is being portrayed by many as a watershed in the history of air power. For the ªrst time, the use of air strikes alone brought a foe to its knees—and at the cost of no NATO lives. The prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power visionaries appear realized.1 Lieut. Gen. Michael Short, who ran the bombing campaign, has argued that “NATO got every one of the terms it had stipulated in Rambouillet and beyond Rambouillet, and I credit this as a victory for air power.”2 This view is not conªned to the air force. Historian John Keegan conceded, “I didn’t want to change my beliefs, but there was too much evidence accumulating to stick to the article of faith. It now does look as if air power has prevailed in the Balkans, and that the time has come to redeªne how victory in war may be won.”3 Dissenters, of course, raise their voices. Noting the failure of air power to fulªll its promise in the past, they are skeptical of its efªcacy in Kosovo. Instead, they point to factors such as the threat of a ground invasion, the lack of Russian support for Serbia, or the resurgence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as key to Milosevic’s capitulation . Without these factors, dissenters argue, air strikes alone would not have International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5–38© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5 Daniel L. Byman is a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation. Matthew C. Waxman is a consultant with the RAND Corporation. The authors would like to thank Natalie Crawford, Robert Mullins, Jeremy Shapiro, Alan Vick, and anonymous reviewers of International Security for their critiques and suggestions. The authors also invite comments: byman@rand.org, waxman@aya.yale.edu. 1. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Ofªce of Air Force History, 1942). Works by other visionaries include H.H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York: Harper, 1941); and William M. Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925). Much of the early debate over how best to use air power took place inside various air forces. For useful overviews of this history, see Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989); and Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths to Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997). 2. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, “Air Wars Won’t Stay Risk Free, General Says,” New York Times, June 18, 1999, p. A8. Gen. Michael J. Dugan, a former U.S. Air Force chief of staff, declared: “For the ªrst time in history—5,000 years of history of man taking organized forces into combat—we saw an independent air operation produce a political result.” Quoted in James A. Kitªeld, “Another Look at the Air War That Was,” Air Force Magazine (October 1999), p. 40. 3. Quoted in John Diamond, “Air Force Strategists Fight Overconªdence Built by Air Victory,” European Stars and Stripes, July 4, 1999, p. 1. forced Milosevic’s hand. They also point out that air power failed to prevent the very ethnic cleansing that prompted Western leaders to act in the ªrst place.4 The importance of this debate goes beyond bragging rights. Already, some military planners are using their interpretations of the air war in Kosovo, Operation Allied Force, to design future campaigns. All the services are drawing on Kosovo’s supposed lessons in their procurement requests.5 Unfortunately, the current debate over air power’s effectiveness confuses more than it enlightens. The Kosovo experience does little to vindicate the general argument that air attacks alone can compel enemy states to yield on key interests. But this caution to air...