In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia

Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia I n 1991 five new Central Asian states-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-rose from the rubble of the Soviet empire. The region’s security will be shaped by the interplay between Russia’s politics and the degree of stability in Central Asia. The stability of CentralAsia hinges on three variables: Uzbek hegemony and irredentism, the balance between political institutionalization and social mobilization, and the extent of disorder generated by the wrenching postSoviet economic transition. The key questions regarding Russia ’s politics are these: how robust is Russia’s democratization?How influential are its pro-imperial elites? Will a discredited democracy be supplanted by an ultra-nationalist, authoritarian regime? Preponderant Russian power is an important constant-an enabling condition-but in itself tells us little about the nature of future Russian policy in Central Asia. In this article, after providing a brief background on Central Asia to set the context, I outline the principal determinants of Central Asian security. I then illustrate their significancewith four scenarios of Russian-Central Asian relations . Throughout this inquiry, the prospects for a neo-imperial Russian policy remain a key preoccupation.’ For this reason, I assessthe ways in which Central Rajan Menon is Monroe Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University and a Visiting Scholar at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University. He is the author of Soviet Power and the Third World (Yale University Press, 1986)and co-editor of Limits to Power (Lexington Books, 1989).This article is part of a larger study funded by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. I acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which provided release time from teaching and funding for interviews and research in Central Asia. I am grateful to the Harriman Institute for providing me with a second intellectual home that is both congenial and stimulating. A number of friends and colleaguesread this paper in its various incarnations and provided extensivewritten comments. My foremost debt in this regard is to Alexander Motyl and Hendrik Spruyt. My thanks, as well, to Henri Barkey, Karen Barkey, Rogers Brubaker,Michael David-Fox, Theodore Friedgut, Chaim Kaufmann, Ronald Meyer, Jack Snyder, and Charles Ziegler. Finally, I wish to thank Sergei Gretsky for sharing with me his detailed knowledge of Tajikistan. 1. I define neo-imperialism as infringements on a weaker state by a great power through its ability to apply increasing amounts of military power (shows of force,support for insurgents, cross border operations, and outright invasion)to shape the external orientation and internal order of the weaker state. International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 149-181 0 1995by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 149 International Security 20:1 1 150 Asian states might cope with the irreducible reality of preponderant Russian power. I conclude by discussing the implications of my arguments for U.S. policy. Setting the Context Bounded by the Caspian Sea to the west, China’s Xinjiang region to the east, Russia to the north, and Iran and Afghanistan to the south, Central Asia has a population of almost 50 million and occupies just under four million square kilometers. The diverse topography includes the vast, sparsely populated steppe of Kazakhstan; the densely populated Ferghana Valley that traverses Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; large deserts (the Karakum in Turkmenistan , the Kyzylkum in Uzbekistan); and the rugged mountains of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. As Table 1 shows, the countries of Central Asia vary markedly in size and population. The two most populous are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan spans an area equivalent to one-third of the lower 48 states of the United States, Uzbekistan is two-thirds the size of Texas, and Turkmenistanis as large as Colorado and Wyoming combined. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan is the size of South Dakota, and Tajikistan only as large as Iowa.2The cultural and linguistic roots of indigenous Central Asians are Turkic; the Tajiks, with their Persian language and culture, are an exception. The vast majority of Central Asia’s non-Slavic people are Sunni Muslim. While militant Islam may emerge as a...