Why the Third World Still Matters

I T h e end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have not ended the importance of the Third World to American interests and worldwide stability, nor have they ushered in a new era of peace.’ Because war will not become obsolete in the Third World, and because many Third World states are becoming increasingly powerful, the threat that Third World states pose to themselves and non-Third World countries will persist. Preparing to address these threats must be a central component of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. During the Cold War, a near consensus of scholarly opinion emerged arguing that the United States vastly exaggerated the threats posed by the Soviet Union in the Third World. The Soviets were seen as uninterested in dominating the Third World, incapable of doing so if they tried, and unable to significantly improve their ability to threaten the United States even if their efforts succeeded. Adherents of this view asserted that inasmuch as the Third World-whether under Soviet control or not-posed no threat to the United States, the United States should avoid wasting scarce resources on secondary concerns, especially while truly vital interests (e.g., preventing a Steven R. David is Professor of Political Science at the ]ohm Hopkins University. I would like to thank Stephen Van Evera, Aaron Friedberg and the members of the Johns Hopkins University seminar, ”The United States and the Third World,” for their suggestions. I would also like to thank the Bradley Foundation for its financial support. The views expressed are my own. 1. Drawing upon the United Nations categorization, I include in the ”Third World” all Countries except the United States, the European republics of the former Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states, and the People’s Republic of China. I recognize that the term ”Third World” is becoming increasingly problematic with the demise of bipolarity, the end of the “Second World,” political fragmentation among the nonaligned, and the high growth rates of some Third World states. Nevertheless, I maintain that states traditionally characterized as ”Third World” maintain enough similarities (e.g., young states created by colonial powers) to justify considering them together. For more on this point, see Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), especially ch. 1; and Steven R. David, ”Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), especially pp. 238-242. ~ International Security, Vol 17, No 3 (Winter 1992193), pp 127-159 01992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Inshtute of Technology 127 International Security 17:3 I 128 Soviet attack on Western Europe, deterring superpower nuclear war) required America’s full attention.2 With the Cold War over, a new set of arguments has emerged reemphasizing the irrelevance of the Third World to American interests. Whatever value the Third World may have held for the United States during the Cold War has, it is now claimed, been lost once the superpower competition for influence ended. Because the Cold War played such a central (if misguided) role in defining the importance of the Third World to the United States and provoking American involvement there, the end of the Cold War will remove all but the most peripheral of U.S. concerns with Third World developments. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, it is asserted, most Third World countries cannot threaten the United States and the few that can do so will not, because it would not be in their interests. The removal of the superpower competition in the Third World is also seen as eliminating one of the principal causes of conflict among the developing countries. Without American and Soviet involvement, according to this view, Third World states will not be driven to attack one another, nor will they be given the sophisticated weaponry to prosecute the wars that nevertheless may break out. The United States thus confronts Third World states that are less important to its interests and less likely to threaten those interests through war. While disagreements persist regarding the level of involvement the United States should seek to retain...