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Managing Soviet Disintegration A Demand for Behavioral Regimes Ted Hopf o n e could easily believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union is all to the good. The military threat that emanated from Moscow throughout the Cold War has been all but eliminated. Peoples whose identities were suppressed for three-quarters of a century under Communist rule, and as long as 250 years under Russian rule, can now exercise their right to national self-determination. Socialist economic practices are being consigned to the dustbin of history. Unfortunately, these welcomeconsequencesof Sovietdisunion have a dark and dangerous side as well. While Western security is not threatened by the prospect of Soviet hegemony over Eurasia, it is affected by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the new non-Russian republics. The exerciseof national self-determinationhas led to nationalistic excessesagainst other national minorities within these new independent states. These excesses are not only morally repugnant, but they also have security implications , in that an aggrieved minority may effectively appeal for aid to its motherland-in most cases, Russia. The prospect of wars among the postSoviet republics is discouraging enough, but far worse are the spirals of hostility and arms racing that they are likely to set off. The result could easily be the resuscitation of the threat from Russia: a paranoid, insecure state, surrounded by hostile republics, that over-arms against all of them in response . An over-armed Russia would once again raise the specter of a threat to Western security that the collapse of the Soviet Union was to have forever buried. Russian security is a Western security interest. The West should adopt policies now that minimize the chances that this specter will reappear. The West should try to ensure that Russia’s security environment remains as Ted Hopf is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan. He is the author of theforthcoming book, PeripheralVisions:Deterrence Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World. The author would like especially to thank Mike Desch, Sue Peterson, and Jon Mercer for criticizingseveraldrafts of this paper. He also wishes to thank Charlie Glaser, Bob Axelrod, Karl Mueller, Matt Evangelista, and Nick Westcott for useful and timely comments. Anne Sartori and Nina Beebe provided research assistance. The Ford Foundation’s Consensus Project furnished financial support.The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies provideda stimulating forum for an early presentation of the author’s arguments. International Security, Summer 1992 (Vol. 17, No.1) 8 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 44 Managing Soviet Disintegration I45 benign as possible. This probability can be increased by helping post-Soviet republics avoid setting off spirals of hostility amongst themselves. The West should establish standards of conduct on domestic and military policy for all of the new post-Soviet states, including Russia. The West should reward adherence to these rules with political, economic, and security advantages. Failure to adhere should have clear costs for the violators. In sum, the West should establish behavioral regimes for the new postSoviet republics. The rules of the regimes, if observed, would address Western security concerns by establishing a benign security environment for Russia and its new sovereign neighbors. The failure to attempt such regimecreation is likely to allow the gains from Sovietdisintegration to go unreaped. Current Western policy is not adequate to the task of advancing Western security interests even though, at first blush, it may look as if the West, or at least the United States, is already setting standards of behavior for postSoviet republics. For example, during Secretary of State Baker’s recent tour of the Soviet Union, he told the leadership of each republic he visited that Washington would not recognize them unless they fulfilled four conditions: 1)adhere to all treaties concerning nuclear and conventional weapons that the former Soviet Union had signed; 2) treat national minorities properly; 3) respect human rights; and 4) undertake economic liberalization. Unfortunately, however, the administration apparently bowed to criticism from Democrats that Bush and Baker were not recognizing the post-Soviet republics rapidly enough. Instead of resisting this partisan attack, and developing a strategically sound policy, the...

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