A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy

A PrecariousPeace Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy 1 Michael McFaul I Throughout the history of the modem world, domestic regime change-be it democratization, automatization,decolonization, decommunization,federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions-has often triggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from the ancien regime compete with new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguousways. This uncertain contextprovides opportunitiesfor politicalactors,both new and old, to pursue new strategies for achieving their objectives, including belligerent policies against both domestic and international foes. In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefited from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strikeout againsttheir enemiesas a means to shoreup their domestic legitimacy. In the name of democracy, independence, the revolution, or the nation, the beneficiaries of regime change also can resort to violence against both domesticand international opponentsto secure their new gains. The protracted regime transformation under way in Russia seems like a probableprecipitantof internationalconflict.Over the last decade,old political institutions have collapsed while new democratic institutions have yet to be consolidated.Concurrently,politicalfigures,organizations,and interestgroups that benefited from the old Soviet order have incurred heavy lossesin the new Russian polity. The new, ambiguous institutional context also has allowed militant, imperialist political entrepreneursto assume salient roles in Russian politics. Reflectingon Russia’s ongoing regime change, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have hypothesized that ”states like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization-from total autocracy to extensive Michael McFaul is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, where he also has appointments at the Homer Institution and the Center for International Security and Arms Control. He also is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I would like to thank Chip Blacker, Jim Goldgeier, Andrew Kuchins, Donna Norton, Stephen Sestanovich, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier presentations and draftsof this article.My participationin a workshopin July1997, sponsoredjointlyby the Moscow Carnegie Center and the magazine Business in Russia, called “The Foreign Policies of Russian corporations” also was extremely valuable in the preparationof this article. hfm@thd Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 5-35 8 1997 by the President and Fellows of Hoard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5 Internafional Security 22:3 1 6 mass democracy-are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.”’ And yet, Russia has not erupted into civil war or fought an international war in the last decade. Of course, its transition from communism has been punctuated with outbursts of violent conflict, including a military showdown between the Soviet and Russian governments in August 1991,a bloody battle between the legislative and executivebranches of government in October 1993, and the tragic war in Chechnya begun in December 1994.When compared to regime changes in other great powers over the last two hundred years, however , Russia’s dramatic regime change has been relatively peaceful and has not triggered a major international conflict. Why not? The answer has to do with the ideas and interests of the winners in Russia‘s regime transition. While the unconsolidated institutions of Russia’s new polity have provided a context that old interest groups or new militants might have exploited to pursue belligerent policies both at home and abroad, these potential war-prone political forces have not assumed power in Russia to date. Instead, political leaders, political organizations, and economic groups that have had both normative and material interests in international cooperation rather than international conflict have prevailed. Though challengedat several criticaljunctures, Russian liberals-defined here most minimally as those committed to markets, free trade, individual rights, and democracy-have defeated their illiberal opponents during most of Russia’s volatile regime transition.* Their victories, in turn, have ensured that Russia has pursued peaceful, integrationist policies with all democratic states (as well as with most other nondemocratic states) rather than belligerent strategies. In underscoring the importance of liberal victories in Russian...