Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection

Counterforce and I Earl c.Ravenu/ Alliance: The Ultimate1 Connection I America’s drift to counterforce nuclear strategies is neither perverse nor accidental. The emphasis on counterforce became a notable aspect of the nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration, at least in its promulgation of Presidential Directive 59 in July 1980 and its promotion of the MX intercontinental missile; and it continues in the strategy of the Reagan Administration, embodied in the weapons system decisions of October 2, 1981. To grasp the rationale of counterforce, it is necessary to understand the logic of extended deterrence. For ultimately it is its adherence to alliance commitments that skews the United States’ strategy toward counterforce weapons and targeting and warps American doctrines of response toward the first use of nuclear weapons , prejudicing crisis stability and increasing the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. Few realize how intertwined American weapons and strategies are with American commitments. And few understand how integral to the entire foreign policy stance of the United States has been the strategic paradigm of deterrence and alliance that the U.S. has maintained for thirty-five yearsand therefore, how much would have to change, if we set about to achieve an alternative, more stable, nuclear stance that might provide greater safety for Americans in an age of pervasive nuclear danger. But also, few see how much is actually changing, under the surface of the familiar strategic and diplomatic arrangements, precisely because the objective conditions that are the requisites of America’s present stance are not being fulfilled. The Paradoxes of Deterrence Critiques of deterrence are not novel; they have been the mainstay of strategic writing over the past four decades.l If they fall short of being definitive, the Earl C. Ravenal, a former official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a professor of international relations at the Georgetown University School uf Foreign Service. He is the author of Never Again: Learning From America’s Foreign Policy Failures and several other books and numerous articles on American foreign and military policy. 1. These days, one must enter a blanket plea of guilty, at the outset of any discussion of this subject, to the charge of presenting facts and numbers about deterrence, counterforce, and International Security, Spring 1982 (Vol. 6, No. 4) 0162-2889/82/040026-18$02,5010 @ 1982by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 26 Counterforce and Alliance I 27 reason perhaps is that the concept of deterrence is not just maddeningly elusive, but perverse. It presents not just dilemmas, or even contradictions, but paradoxes. Nations gravitate to deterrence-or emphasize the component of pure deterrence (in the sense of threatened retaliation) over the component of practical defense (in the sense of denial)-when they cannot afford defense; or when defense is not seen to be worth the cost; or when defense is impossible at any cost (that is, when it cannot realistically limit damage); or when deterrence just seems, by comparison, to be an irresistible bargain. Deterrence appears to offer an advantage, but at the same time embodies a flaw. It presents the prospect of achieving efficiently the protection of the United States and of its allies, of America’s core values and other objects of American interest. With regard to deterrence in general, rather than having to create incrementally each element of actual defense (if that could even be done), it is cheaper to manipulate threats of destruction. With particular regard to extended deterrence, once it is created it seems infinitely expandable at no marginal cost; there is the prospect of almost magical replication; the nuclear umbrella will cover any and all by the sheer exercise of commitment . But these are both false promises. The economy of deterrence is confused by its paradoxes; the supposed efficiency of extended deterrence is negated by its entailed costs, its strategic dangers, and, in the end, its inherent incredibility. The efficacy of deterrence depends on exaggerating the magnitude and probability of U.S. retaliation, and so leads to the paradoxes of destruction and credibility. The paradox of destruction arises from the contradiction between the avoidance of destruction if war happens and...