Risk, Glory, and the Rescue Operation

and the Rescue Operation I o n the morning of April 25, 1980, the world awoke to the story of the ill-fated American rescue operation in Iran. This unsuccessful attempt to free the fifty-two American hostages who had been held captive since November 1979 became the topic of the day. And it has become the topic of comment and analysis by congressional committees, defense analysts, top-level cabinetofficials, and presidential candidates. These have been as unsuccessful in capturing the full complexity of such unique operations as ”Operation Eagle Claw” was in recapturing the fifty-two hostages. Only the tip of a rescue operation is visible. Its violent phase is normally very short. It takes seconds, or minutes at most, and it is immediately followed by a media outburst of either rejoicing or recrimination. The bulk of the operation is invisible. Its hidden elements include the deliberations preceding the operation, the confrontations between politics and military planning, the influences surrounding the decision of whether or not to intervene, and the expectations and assumptions of the would-be rescuers. Some of this may eventually be leaked to the press, but it will be too long after the fact to command popular attention. The many facets and unique qualities of the rescue operation are therefore seldom grasped by the general public. As a result, the rescue operation is commonly the object of unrealistic expectations. As President Reagan pointed out soon after his inauguration, terrorism has become a widespread and regrettable fact of today’s international system. The chain of crises triggered by such acts can be so devastating that it undermines modern systems of democratic government. But to suggest that the rescue operation is a panacea for dealing with terrorist incidents is to underestimate its complexity. Certain considerations should give pause to The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the helpful observations of Michael Handel throughout the preparation of this essay, and the valuable editorial advice of Jill Shindler Handel. An expanded version of this essay on rescue operations by Shlomo Gazit will appear as a monographpublished by Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs. Major General Shlomo Gazit (retired)served as Director of Military Intelligenceof Israel from 1974-1979. In that post during the Israeli operation at Entebbe, Gazit participated in the planning of that rescue effort. He was Coordinator of Government Operations in the Occupied Territories from 1967-1974. lntemational Security,Summer 1981 (Vol. 6,No.1) 0162-2889/81/010111-25$02.50/0 01981 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 111 International Security I 112 the planner or political leader in the decision to go forward with a rescue operation. I cannot expect to revolutionize the way in which the media and public opinion will react to such circumstancesin the future. But as one who has closely followed many Israeli decisions in hostage-holdingsituations, and is familiar with the problems that Israelis face when planning a rescue operation , I hope to shed some light on the essential qualities of these missions. I would like to bring the reader’s understanding of them more in line with reality. The Rescue Operation as a Political Act It is a popular misconceptionthat rescue operationsare classicalmilitary acts. In reality, they are different both in purpose and in method. All considerations for and against the operation, as well as all details of the plan and its constraints, are dominated by political motives. Rescue operations require methods and means which the military apparatus does not normally employ and is therefore not trained to execute. This holds critical implications for assessing an operation’s likelihood of success, as well as for determiningwho has the authority to approvea plan, and how an operation in progress should be controlled. Governments have been forced to organize, equip, and train special units since regular military forces are incapable of carrying out this unique type of mission. The mission is not to attack an enemy position in order to occupy or destroy it; nor is it a standard military raid aimed at inflicting maximum casualties upon enemy forces, destroying vital equipment, or taking enemy prisoners. Distinguished from other military operationsby its...