Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work

Telling i n Intelligence Work I But if the watchman see the sword come, and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned; if the sword come and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity, but his blood will I require at the watchman’s hand. -Ezekiel 33:6. Throughout history, kings and generals customarily called on astrologists or fortune-tellers in order to obtain adviceprior to making any important decision such as launching a military campaign. This was a natural way of trying to solve a very old problem-decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Although many of us still read our daily horoscope in a spirit of fun and entertainment, and even call on a fortune-teller, modem governments can hardly rely on this ancient method of taking counsel. Today, intelligence professionals have inherited the role of those occult persons, except that they are called staff officers or civil servants. Although they also serve at the right hand of the decision-maker, any attempts to draw a more detailed comparison between the analyst and the fortune-teller would reveal two very different species. Intelligenceprofessionals obviously never claimed that they could read the future. Although constantly enshrouded in secrecy, intelligence work is nothing more than a straight-forward scientific and technological discipline that should serve distinct analytical needs. Intelligence certainly has capabilities and advantages that should be understood and exploited; but one should be equally aware of its limitations. Decision-makers-both civilian and military -who do not understand this, must often share responsibilitywith their intelligence analysts for bad decisions based on speculative estimates. In brief, this article discusses how a better understanding of the complex relationship between intelligence and its “clients,” the decision-makers, can lead to more satisfactory, well-integrated performance. I am indebted for observations to Michael Handel, Richard Betts and Arie Offri, and to Jill Shindler for her editorial help. Major General Shlomo Gazit served as Director of Military Intelligence of Israel from 1974-1979. He was Coordinatorof Government Operations in Occupied Territoriesfrom 1967-1974. 36 Estimates and Fortune Telling I 37 The Special Traits of IntelligenceAnalysts What distinguishes the intelligence professional from other analysts? What is his advantage over any other expert? Highly qualified academicresearchers or journalists are in no way inferior to the average intelligence analyst: all have acquired expertise through academic studies, military schools, or long personal experience. Nevertheless, there are three major characteristics that distinguish the intelligence analyst from other observers of world affairs: -Access to special, intimate, and sensitive data complements authoritative knowledge of a given area. The obvious significance of this characteristic is that the greater the amount of reliable and accurate classified information at his disposal, the greater the intelligence analyst’s advantage over other experts in the same subject. -The intelligence analyst’s main advantage lies in the procedure of collective and comprehensive analysis. Sound analysis of a given country must encompass a wide range of its activities and problems. National decisions, as well as the political, diplomatic or propaganda activities of a country, are reflected in its military preparations (which must also be identified in the separate service branches, in civilian and economic preparations, and in its long-range decisions. When a relatively large group of intelligence analysts, each of whom is an expert in a different field, meet to discuss one particular problem, integration of their various viewpoints yields an aggregate picture of the country in question. This comparison of notes, cross-checkingof data, and verificationof facts contributes to a much better and more comprehensive analysis. In many cases, a single military indicator is not sufficient to justify what should be a red-light alert; therefore, it should be corroborated by indicators from other areas of study. In comparison with integrated analysis, the separate, decentralized system of study moves at a slower pace and is less likely to identify significant developments. At the same time, integrated analysis may breed one of the dangers which threatens any group of intelligence analysts, namely, becoming “captive to a concept.” The process of collective thinking can create collective aberration. Prolonged discussions within the same group of analysts steer peer group thinking...