Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission

the Standing consultativeI and Michael Krepon commission 1 Unresolved compliance problems have accumulated to the point where they have become a major impediment to the maintenance of existing agreements and the negotiation of new accords. While progress in compliance diplomacy has recently been made, major problems, such as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, have not been satisfactorily resolved in the forum created by the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) to address SALT compliance questions -the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Like other negotiating bodies, the SCC has no powers of enforcement and it cannot impose sanctions; it can succeed only when the political leadership in the Soviet Union and the United States seek mutually satisfactory solutions . The SCC is a tool for Moscow and Washington to use as each sees fit. Its utility depends on effective use by both governments. Given proper instructions, high-level political support, problem-solving tactics, and sound bilateral relations, the Soviet and U.S. Commissioners can work together quite effectively. However, even the most efficacious tactics in the SCC will not bear fruit if either Commissioner is operating under unhelpful instructions , if the superpowers question each other’s intentions toward past agreements , and if they do not wish to maintain the viability of those agreements. It should therefore come as no surprise that, during the past five years, the SCC has fared no better than the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, both governments have taken care to keep the SCC channel open during periods of harsh public exchanges. Useful discussions on sensitive military subjects continued even after the Soviet Union walked out of negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in 1983. Despite its importance, very little is known about the SCC, and many misconceptions have arisen about its activities. The object of this essay is to explain the nature of the SCC and to suggest steps to improve the utility and effectiveness of its operations. The authors wish to thank Carnegie Endowment Verification Project advisors for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Sidney N.Graybeal was the U.S. Coinmissioner at the Standing Consultative Coinmissionfrom 1973 to 1977. Miclzael Krepon is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of its Verification Project. Irzternntiot7ul Security, Fall 1985 (Vol. 10, No. 2) 01985by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 183 lnternational Security I 184 The SCC’s Mandate and Operations No arms control agreement can be written so carefully and so clearly as to prevent ambiguities and coinpliance questions from arising. In some instances , parties to an agreement may not wish or may not be able to arrive at precise treaty language. They may have different interpretations of their obligations under an agreement, or new military technologies may create circumstances that were not anticipated during negotiations. Early in the SALT I negotiations, both sides recognized the need for a private forum to implement treaty provisions and to deal with ambiguities and compliance questions. As a result, there were few difficulties in drafting Article XI11 of the ABM Treaty creating the SCC. The ABM Treaty, and thus the SCC, are of indefinite duration. A Memorandum of Understanding formally establishing the SCC in December 1972 extended its jurisdiction to include the Accidents Measures Agreement signed the previous year, and regulations governing the SCC’s operations were drawn up the following May. The SCC’s charter, as spelled out in both the ABM and SALT I1 treaties, is quite broad. It empowers representatives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to consider, among other topics, treaty compliance questions and ”related situations,” questions involving interference with national technical means of verification, “possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing” on treaty provisions, additional measures to increase the viability of existing agreements including amendments to treaty provisions, and proposals for ”further limiting strategic arms.” In addition, the SCC Commissioners are authorized to exchange relevant information and to draw up procedures for dismantling or destroying offensive and defensive weapon systems.’ The Memorandum of Understanding establishing the SCC clarifies basic organizational matters while leaving considerable discretion to the two delegations...